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Abstract 
Research on the forward effect of testing has indicated that taking a test over prior material can 
improve one’s ability to memorize new material.  However, no research has yet indicated whether 
such testing can improve one’s ability to understand or comprehend new complex prose material.  
Theory and data from the comprehension literature, testing effect literature, and 
metacomprehension literature suggest that test-taking may have this forward effect on one’s ability 
to understand complex prose material.  A series of experiments are conducted that tested this 
possibility.  In each experiment, participants (1) read a text, (2) reprocessed that first text in some 
way, (3) read a second text that was related to the first text, (4) took an inference test over the 
second text, which was used to assess their comprehension of it.  It was hypothesized that 
answering inference questions over an initial text would better enable one to understand a 
subsequent, related text than would rereading the initial text (Experiments 1 and 2) or answering 
memory questions over the initial text (Experiment 3).  It was also hypothesized that answering 
these inference questions would be more effective if the answer-choices were accompanied by 
arguments than if they were not (Experiment 4).  Ultimately, only the hypothesis of Experiment 4 
was supported.  Ps likely must have a certain degree of motivation to learn in order for there to be 
a forward effect of testing on comprehension.  Nonetheless, it is argued that inference questions 
should be used more frequently in education. 
 Keywords: testing effect; comprehension; metacomprehension 
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Forward Effect of Testing on Comprehending Complex Texts 
Cognitive psychologists recently have proposed that educators dramatically increase the 
number of tests and quizzes given in classes, not only because test-taking is a potent learning 
event (Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, Nathan, & Willingham, 2013; Pashler, et al., 2007; Roediger, 
Putnam, & Smith, 2011; Roediger & Pyc, 2012), but also because students are largely under the 
illusion that test-taking is not a learning event at all (R. Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013).  
However, the kinds of questions on these tests is important because students tend to study new 
class material in a way consistent with how they expect to be tested on it—the test-expectancy 
effect (McDaniel, Blischak, & Challis, 1994)—and a major predictor that students use in this 
regard is experience from prior tests.  Thus, students might try to merely memorize information 
explicitly stated in lectures and textbooks if prior tests only assessed their memory for this 
information (Thiede, Wiley, & Griffin, 2011).  This is problematic because one must have a 
deeper understanding of a given body of information in order to apply one’s knowledge of it to 
novel situations, and to not have knowledge that is “inert” (W. Kintsch, 1994).   
Educators presumably hope that their students will apply what they have learned outside 
the confines of the classroom (Momsen, Long, Wyse, & Ebert-May, 2010).  Thus, it is desirable 
to use test questions that require learners to apply explicitly stated information to novel contexts 
and to deduce what is only implicit in that information.  I will be referring to such questions as 
inference questions.  Inference questions prompt students to try to understand subsequent texts 
rather than to just memorize them (Thiede et al., 2013).  However, many issues remain, such as 
whether the act of taking inference tests has benefits other than instilling test-expectancy effects, 
and whether the nature of these benefits varies as a function of the type inference question used.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore these issues. 
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 Although there has been plentiful research on the effects of testing in recent years (for a 
review, see Roediger et al., 2011), the vast majority of this research has been on backward effects 
of testing; research on the forward effects of testing has barely begun (for a review, see Pastötter 
& Bäuml, 2014).  The backward effect of testing occurs when taking a test improves one’s 
learning of the information that was tested.  For example, Roediger and Karpicke (2006) found 
that participants (Ps) forgot the information contained in a science passage much more slowly if 
they had earlier tested themselves over that information than if they had earlier reread it.  The 
forward effect of testing, by contrast, occurs when taking a test improves one’s learning of 
information that is first presented after the test is taken.  Although we will make use of the 
substantial research done on the backward effect of testing, the focus of this dissertation is on the 
relatively unexplored forward effects of testing.   
 In the following literature review, I will begin by describing current research on the 
forward effect of testing, and point out that possible forward effects of testing on comprehension 
(as opposed to memory) are yet to be explored.  I will then briefly discussion two topics 
important to this consideration, namely, research on comprehension and research on the testing 
effect.  In so doing, I will briefly describe W. Kintsch’s (1994) construction-integration model as 
well as two different theories about the backward effect of testing.  As we will see, only one of 
these two different testing effect theories seems to predict a forward effect of testing on 
comprehension.  I will then argue that, nonetheless, considerations from the metacomprhension 
literature strongly suggest that answering some kinds of test questions will improve the ability to 
comprehend a future, related topic.  There will then be a brief discussion of which kinds of test 
questions will be most beneficial to students in this regard.   
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I will ultimately form the following hypotheses.  First, answering inference question over 
a text will result in a larger forward effect than will rereading that text.  Second, answering 
inference question over a text will also result in less subsequent mind-wandering than will 
rereading that text.  Third, I will hypothesize that answering inference questions will result in a 
larger forward effect than will answering memory questions.  Lastly, I will hypothesize that 
answering multiple-choice inference questions in which each answer-choice is accompanied by 
an argument supporting it will result in a larger forward effect than will answering multiple-
choice questions in which each answer-choice is not accompanied by an argument supporting it.   
Research on Forward Effect of Testing 
 There have been a number of studies demonstrating that testing does indeed have a 
forward effect.  For example, Szpunar, McDermott, and Roediger (2008) had Ps study five lists 
of unrelated, common nouns.  Ps were better able to encode and remember the words from the 
fifth list if they had taken tests earlier over the first four lists than if they had merely solved math 
problems.  Much of the research establishing the forward effect of testing does, like Szpunar et 
al. (2008), use simple learning material that can only be memorized and that do not admit of 
learning at a deeper level (e.g., Nunes & Weinstein, 2012; Tulving & Watkins, 1974; Wahlheim, 
2015; Yang, Potts, & Shanks, 2017).  Thus, many of the theoretical explanations of these 
findings will not be of much interest to this dissertation.   
For example, Pastötter, Schicker, Niedernhuber, and Bäuml (2011) gave evidence from 
electroencephalorgram data suggesting that tests help one to maintain attention at a high level.  
There is also evidence that tests can cause dramatic shifts in mental contexts, meaning that P’s 
memories for each list will be better differentiated from each other (Sahakyan & Hendricks, 
2012).  In other words, taking tests over the first four lists in Szpunar et al.’s (2008) study 
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enabled Ps to encode each list as a unique episode of simple and manageable size as opposed to 
encoding all lists within a single, large episode.  One thing to note about these kinds of 
explanations is how ephemeral the benefit is: taking a quiz at the end of a class today will in no 
way improve learning of the material presented in the next class.  That next class will already be 
in a sufficiently different context and the main determinant of a student’s attention during it will 
be what was transpiring right before that class.  More importantly, though, is that these effects of 
testing do not so much improve one’s ability to understand subsequent information as they allow 
one to maintain the ability one already had (or to prevent that ability from declining as a result of 
fatigue).  Hence, it is so far unclear whether testing will be of substantial benefit in facilitating 
the understanding of more complex material. 
There have so far been three studies documenting a forward effect of testing for the 
learning of more complex material.  Szpunar, Khan, and Schacter (2013, Experiment 2) 
presented Ps with a 20-min lecture video over statistics, which was divided into four 5-min 
segments.  In between each segment, Ps either (1) answered questions about information covered 
in the prior segment, (2) read those very same questions along with their answers, or (3) solved 
unrelated math problems.  Once the final segment was presented, all Ps took a test over that final 
segment.  Ps who had taken earlier tests did better on this final test than did Ps from the other 
groups.  Jing, Szpunar, and Schacter (2016) found the same results in a similar study, in which 
Ps viewed a 40-min video over the sociology of health care (divided into eight 5-min segments).  
Importantly, both Szpunar et al. (2013) and Jing et al. (2016) found that the Ps who had to 
answer test questions reported less mind-wandering than did the other Ps; the authors argue that 
this reduction in mind-wandering is an explanation for why they observed a forward effect of 
testing. 
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Wissman, Rawson, and Pyc (2011, Experiment 3) also conducted a study in which there 
was a forward effect of testing in the learning of complex material.  They presented Ps with a 
text on storing greenhouse gases, which was broken up into 3 segments (roughly 330 words per 
segment).  In between each segment, one group attempted to recall the information presented in 
the prior segment, whereas the other group solved unrelated math problems.  Both groups tried to 
recall all of the information presented in the third segment once they finished reading it.  The 
group that had earlier attempted to recall information from the prior segments was better able to 
recall the information presented on the final segment than was the group that had worked on 
math problems.   
One thing to note about the experiments just described is that they only demonstrated that 
tests can improve one’s ability to remember subsequent information; none of them measured the 
Ps’ understanding of or ability to make inferences from the presented information.  This 
distinction is important because some manipulations improve memory at the expense of 
understanding (Hinze, Griffin, Wiley, 2013; Mannes & Kintsch, 1987).  Nonetheless, there are 
reasons to expect that testing can improve the ability to understand information presented in the 
future. 
First, there is the fact that deep understanding of a text usually requires the use of 
relevant background knowledge (Kintsch, 1994; McNamara & Kintsch, 1996), and the plentiful 
research on the backward effect of testing has established that testing can facilitate the learning 
of the information being tested (Roediger et al., 2011), which could become relevant background 
knowledge for a later text.  For example, consider a fairly advanced textbook in the sciences.  
Often, one must have already learned the contents of the first chapter in order to fully understand 
the second chapter.  Hence, if taking a test over the first chapter improves one’s learning of it, 
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then it might also improve one’s learning of the second chapter.  However, we will see that the 
way in which testing improves one’s learning of the first chapter is a crucial issue that has 
bearing on this line of reasoning.  I will argue that the metacomprehension benefits of testing—
or the way in which tests facilitate a learner’s ability to gauge how well they understand a text—
suggest that a test over a first chapter will improve learning of the next chapter.  I will elaborate 
on each of these two points. 
Background Knowledge and the Backward Effect of Testing 
The importance of background knowledge for understanding a text can be illustrated in 
Kintsch’s (1994) Construction-Integration Model.  The model distinguishes between 
comprehension of the textbase and comprehension of the situation model.  The textbase refers to 
that which is explicitly stated in a text.  For example, a text might state: “When a baby has a 
septal defect, the blood cannot get rid of enough carbon dioxide through the lungs.”  One can 
read this sentence and understand the textbase—that having a septal defect in some sense causes 
a problem with removing the carbon dioxide.  But, without using other knowledge, it will remain 
unclear why septal defects have this effect.  Hence, relating this sentence to some relevant 
background knowledge is essential for fully understanding it, for seeing how the two parts of the 
sentence relate to each other.  In this case, one would need to know (1) that blood travels through 
the heart just before it goes to the lungs, (2) that blood travels back through the heart 
immediately after it has been cleansed of carbon dioxide in the lungs, and (3) that the septum is a 
wall in the heart that keeps separate the blood that is on its way to the lungs and blood that has 
already gone through the lungs.  If one relates the sentence stated in the text with this 
background knowledge, then one can see how septal defects can causes blood to not be fully 
ridded of carbon dioxide, namely, that some blood that is first entering the heart will, rather than 
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moving on to the lungs, pass instead through the disfigured septum and mix with the blood that 
has already gone through the lungs.  This act of relating and fitting together various pieces of 
information, both from the text and from one’s own background knowledge, is the act of 
constructing the situation model being described in the text, which is the act of understanding the 
text at a deep level.  Background knowledge is in this way often essential for understanding 
complex texts.  I mentioned above that taking a test over the first chapter of a textbook could 
improve one’s ability to understand content from the next chapter if knowledge of the first 
chapter is necessary for understanding the second, and if a test over the first chapter improves 
one’s learning of it.  Much research on the testing effect suggests that tests will have this 
beneficial effect; however, the situation is in fact complicated and requires further analysis. 
One can remember information that is relevant to a task and yet not notice during that 
task that one should remember and apply that information (Gick & Holyoak, 1980).  Thus, while 
reading the second chapter of a textbook (or the sixth chapter), some particular content in that 
chapter must remind you of other relevant information that you have encoded previously if you 
are to think of it and integrate it with the new chapter.  This reminding is more likely if that 
particular bit of old information is embedded within some well-constructed situation model that 
inter-relates a multitude of facts and concepts, for then there are many retrieval routes through 
which one can be reminded of that particular bit of old information (Kintsch, 1994).  By contrast, 
if that bit of information has not been well integrated with other knowledge, and is basically just 
associated to episodic contexts in which it has been encoded, then one will likely have to be first 
reminded of that episode or have that information explicitly prompted in order to remember (W. 
Kintsch, 1994).  Hence, if testing oneself over information only improves the ability to recall that 
information when explicitly prompted to, and does not facilitate its integration within a situation 
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model, then testing may not be beneficial in helping one to understand new information at a deep 
level.  We look next at the theoretical accounts that have been given to explain the backward 
effect of testing in order to examine the possibility that testing oneself over information does 
indeed facilitate the integration of that information within a situation model. 
There are two major accounts that have been proposed to explain the testing effect: the 
episodic context account (ECA; Karpicke, Lehman, & Aue, 2014) and the elaborative retrieval 
hypothesis (ERH; Carpenter, 2009).  The ECA is centered upon the concept of us having 
fluctuating mental contexts (Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1989; see also Estes, 1955).  According to 
this idea, each person processes information within some particular context, which includes 
characteristics of mood, of their surroundings, of the time of the day, etc., as the person 
experiences them.  When one is presented with information and stores it as a memory, he or she 
also encodes some of the features/elements of that context into the memory (encoding of the 
context is usually assumed to be incomplete, though).  If one later tries to recall that information, 
he or she will often try to mentally reinstate features from the context in which the information 
was encoded, which will differ in some degree from the features of the new and current context.  
This idea makes intuitive sense if we consider a person trying to remember something that they 
were taught in a specific class and on a specific day.  Reinstating the context in which the 
information was encoded does help one to remember that information due to there being an 
association between the two, and so one will be more likely to recall the information if one better 
reinstates the context in which it was encoded.  However, reinstatement of the prior context is 
never perfect, and so some elements of the new context will remain.  According to the ECA, if 
the memory is retrieved, then some of the elements from the new context will be encoded into 
that memory.  As a greater variety of context elements become encoded into the memory, the 
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better able one will be to reinstate a subset of those features at a given time in the future (see 
Lehman & Malmberg, 2013), and so the better able one will be to retrieve that memory.  There 
are two reasons why testing oneself over, say, a passage is more conducive to this form of 
context-updating than is rereading.  When you test yourself over some information, you must 
actually retrieve the memory of this information.  This retrieval is also a necessity if one is to 
update that memory with elements from the new and current context.  Also, the focus of one’s 
attention differs between the two activities: because testing requires you to have to remember 
what happened in a prior context, your attention will be strongly focused on context elements.  
Thus, you will encode more of the context elements when testing than when rereading. 
The logic of the ERH, like that of the ECA, is driven by the idea that remembering is a 
cue-driven process: the ability to remember something is largely determined by whether one is 
thinking of other things—“cues”—that are strongly associated with it.  However, whereas the 
ECA focuses on context cues, the ERH focuses on semantic cues.  Consider the situation in 
which one is asked: “Does a septal defect cause people to not get rid of as much carbon dioxide 
as they should?” In this scenario, we are assuming that the person in question has already been 
told the answer and is now trying to remember that answer. According to the ECA, prior testing 
could help people answer this question by facilitating their ability to reinstate a prior context in 
which they learned about the septum.  According to the ERH, by contrast, prior testing would 
help by facilitating people’s ability to directly remember other information related to the heart 
and lungs, and furthermore facilitating the ability of this other information to remind them of the 
answer.  The reason the ERH makes these assumptions can be illustrated thus.  If one is right 
now trying to answer this question about the septal defect, he or she will probably be trying to 
remember what the answer is.  Because remembering is a cue-driven process, the person will be 
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using key words from the question, such as septum, as cues to help remind them of the answer.  
During the period of this activity, some of the other memories associated to these cues will 
become activated, such as memories containing information about the course of blood flow.  If 
one eventually remembers the answer, then not only will the association between the answer and 
‘septum’ be strengthened, but so will the associations between the answer and the other 
information that became activated during the process (Carpenter, 2009; 2011).  Importantly, 
some of this other information might be relevant background knowledge that is necessary for 
understanding a text at a deep level, and perhaps it is more likely to be neglected when one is 
reading the text than when one is trying to remember it.  The ERH explanation of the testing 
effect is thus clearly more consistent with the idea that testing can facilitate the learning of new 
information than is the ECA, for it is only according to the ERH that testing seems to be 
conducive to the construction of situation models, which, again, help one to recognize, during 
later learning events, that some given information is relevant.  The ECA, by contrast, seems 
more consistent with the idea that testing merely improves one’s ability to remember some 
information once one already wants to remember it.  Thus, it is important to determine how 
consistent these accounts (the ERH, in particular, for our purposes) are with the evidence. 
There are two different kinds of evidence that support the ERH, one in which the studied 
material are weakly associated word-pairs and one in which the material consists of science 
passages.  I will discuss each in turn.  Carpenter and Yeung (2017) provided the first kind of 
evidence (see also, Carpenter, 2009; 2011; Rawson, Vaughn, & Carpenter, 2015).  They had Ps 
study weakly associated word-pairs that varied in how strongly each pair’s cue (i.e., the first 
word of the pair) was associated (pre-experiment) to its strongest associate.  For example, one 
study on association norms established that the word chalk reminds people of its strongest 
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associate, board, 69% of the time, whereas soup reminds people of its strongest associate, 
chicken, only 10% of the time (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004).  Carpenter and Yeung 
argued that the word-pair chalk-crayon would show a stronger testing effect than would the 
word-pair soup-onion.  The reason for this is that Ps are more likely to think of an associate 
while being tested over the chalk word-pair (chalk-___?) than while being tested over the soup 
word-pair (soup-___?), for the strong associate that chalk has will likely require little time to 
become activated.  Again, if an associate is activated, then its association to both members of the 
word-pairs will be strengthened, the number of retrieval routes to the second member of the pair 
will therefore be increased, and so the second member will now be more easily recalled when 
one is presented with the first member.  Consistent with this reasoning, Carpenter and Yeung 
(2017) found that there was a bigger testing effect for words with stronger “strongest associates” 
than for words with weaker “strongest associates.”                            
The other significant piece of evidence was given by Hinze et al. (2013).  In their third 
experiment, they had Ps read a series of five texts, with each text covering a different scientific 
subject.  Some Ps were then given time to reread each of the texts, whereas other Ps were asked 
to explain each of the texts without the benefit of having them available.  All participants 
returned after seven days to take a test over the material.  Ps who had been asked to explain the 
texts were better able to answer inference questions on those texts than were the participants who 
merely reread them.  The authors concluded, in line with the ERH, that an attempt to remember 
what each text was about prompted participants to inter-relate various bits of information from 
within a text and from one’s pre-existing background knowledge, and elaborate on how these 
bits of information fit together to form a coherent situation model.  Attempts to remember the 
progression of a science text may have caused the memories of relevant background information 
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to become activated, which is often essential for the integration process (Kintsch, 1994), and 
which often fails to occur when participants passively read a text (McNamara & Kintsch, 1996). 
In contrast to the evidence supporting the ERH just given, Karpicke and Smith (2012) 
have provided evidence that seems to contradict the ERH, at least in its application to the 
learning of simple word-pairs.  Specifically, they had Ps study Swahili-English word-pairs (e.g., 
wingu-cloud) and try to think of semantic mediators while doing so (e.g., wingu is 
orthographically similar to wing, and things with wings can fly up to a cloud).  This task was 
meant to induce the kind of activity that the ERH postulates is responsible for the testing effect, 
but without having the activity occur during attempts to retrieve a specific memory.  This task, 
though, resulted in no better memory for the word-pairs than did merely rereading the word-
pairs.  Hence, it seems that the generation and inter-association of mediators is not the process 
responsible for the testing effect.  Carpenter and Yeung (2017) argued that the activation of 
mediators does not occur to the same extent in the task used by Karpicke and Smith (2012) as it 
does in retrieval attempts.  Taken together, it is, at the very least, unclear if the ERH is adequate 
to explain the benefits of testing for the learning of simple material.   
Furthermore, even though the ERH seems to be necessary to explain the benefit of testing 
for answering inference questions that Hinze et al. (2013) observed (see also, Butler, 2010; 
Johnson & Mayer, 2009; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; McDaniel, Howard, & Einstein), it is still 
possible, as Butler (2010) pointed out, that testing only improves your ability to successfully 
remember information that you consciously try to remember.  To answer an inference question, 
one must (1) recognize what information is relevant to answering the question, (2) successfully 
retrieve that information, and—because the actual answer to the question has not been explicitly 
stated prior—(3) successfully use or apply that information to solve the inference question 
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(Barnett & Ceci, 2002).  I noted earlier that Kintsch’s (1994) model suggests that testing will 
facilitate one’s ability to complete step 1 (i.e., be reminded of the relevant information) if it 
facilitates the integration of that information into a well-constructed situation model.  It seems 
clear that one will also be better able to complete step 3 if the relevant information is integrated 
within a situation model—that is, if one knows how the parts fit together.  However, testing can 
still improve one’s ability to solve inference problems, even if it does not facilitate construction 
of situation models (as seems to be suggested by the ECA), because testing will still improve 
one’s ability to complete step 2, which is also necessary.  Hinze et al.’s (2013) Ps may have 
therefore improved in their ability to answer inference questions despite testing not aiding the 
construction of their situation models (see further discussion of this issue in Butler, Black-Maier, 
Raley, & Marsh, 2017).  In sum, considerations from the metacomprehension literature strongly 
suggest that tests over complex materials can aid construction of the situation model, at least if 
they are the right kinds of questions. 
Testing Effects and Metacomprehension 
Nguyen and McDaniel (2015) found that taking a test over a complex text improves one’s 
ability to monitor how well one has truly understood that text, and to a degree greater than does 
note-taking.  These results are important because this monitoring ability—i.e., 
metacomprehension—is generally quite meager (Maki, 1998), due both to overconfidence in 
general (i.e., poor absolute metacomprehension) and to a poor ability to specify which particular 
portions of a text are best (and least) understood (i.e., poor relative metacomprehension; Wiley et 
al., 2016).  Faulty metacomprehension causes us to terminate reflection on the meaning of a text 
too early (because we are overconfident) and to inappropriately apportion our study efforts 
among the various portions of a text.  The problem, though, is not that there is no effective way 
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to monitor how well one has learned a text.  Otherwise, Nguyen and McDaniel (2015) would not 
have found that tests cause metacomprehension accuracy to increase.  Rather, students tend to 
use ineffective ways of monitoring their comprehension. 
Griffin, Wiley, and Salas (2013) described the monitoring process within a cue-utilization 
framework.  The premise of their metacomprehension model is that we are not able to directly 
gauge how well we understand a text.  In contrast to cars, which have speedometers directly 
telling us how fast we are going, the mind does not provide a read-out that we, for example, 
understand 80% of a text.  We must instead rely on less direct indicators Effective indicators are 
those that assess the coherence and completeness of the situation model that one has derived 
from a text, such as one’s ability to self-explain a text either while reading it (Wiley et al., 2016) 
or with the text absent (Nguyen & McDaniel, 2015).   
Thiede, Griffin, Wiley, and Anderson (2010) found that college students rarely use 
effective indicators, and are much more likely to base their metacomprehension judgments on 
how well they think that they have memorized the ideas explicitly stated in a text, on their 
familiarity with the topic, on their interest in the topic, or even on objective features of the text 
such as its length.  Importantly, Thiede et al. (2010) also found that metacomprehension 
judgements based on these indicators were not nearly as accurate as were those based on 
indicators that tap the situation model.  To sum up, tests foster elaboration of a given situation 
model—as postulated by the ERH—partially because they greatly facilitate one’s ability to 
notice deficiencies in the situation model that need to be reflected upon and addressed (Nguyen 
& McDaniel, 2015).  When information is thus well-integrated within a situation model, as 
opposed to being encoded in separate and unintegrated memory representations, we are better 
able to remember it and use it when trying to make sense of new related information processed at 
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a later time.  We should therefore predict a forward effect of testing in which testing improves 
our ability to understand related information that we process in the future.  However, the kind of 
test questions being answered is very important. 
Different Kinds of Test Questions 
It is possible that taking a test can instill a memorization-processing approach, which 
would entail using monitoring cues that tap the textbase instead of the situation model.  Such 
tests are therefore less likely to foster further construction of the situation model.  Indeed, Hinze 
et al. (2013) found that asking Ps to recall as much information as they could from a prior text 
did not improve their ability to then answer inference questions about that text (at least not more 
so than did rereading).  However, we have already stated that Hinze et al. (2013) did observe this 
improvement when Ps were asked to explain the prior text.  The kinds of tests that are likely to 
improve learner’s ability to assess their own understanding of a text are likely to be the same 
one’s that allow researchers to assess how well they understand a text.  One such kind of test is 
one which consists of inference questions (Kintsch, 2005).  Unlike memory questions, which 
require Ps to remember something explicitly stated in a text, inference questions require Ps to 
infer what was only implicit in—or implied by—the text. 
Most of the research on the testing effect have assessed the learning benefits of answering 
memory question rather than of answering inference questions.  This is perhaps because most of 
the research on the testing effect have been interested in the benefits of retrieving information 
from memory.  Karpicke and Zaromb (2010), for instance, differentiate the testing effect from 
the generation effect on the basis that only in the former case is one in “retrieval mode,” or 
consciously trying to recall a prior experience.  The generation effect, by contrast, refers to the 
fact that generating information produces better memory for that information than does reading 
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it.  For example, one will have a better memory for a list of words if he or she generates each 
word (e.g., “s _ _ rk”) rather than reading each word (e.g., “shark”).  Inference questions seem to 
be a combination of retrieval and generation, for one must both recall the relevant information 
and generate the inference.   
 There have been a few studies in which researchers tried to assess whether there are any 
benefits from answering inference questions rather than from answering memory questions.  
Butler et al. (2017) found that Ps were better able to abstract and apply concepts from a geology 
text—Ps had to use the content of multiple sentences to abstract a single one of these concepts—
if they answered earlier questions that required them to apply these concepts than if they read 
additional text that gave examples of these concepts.  Endres, Carpenter, Martin, and Renkl 
(2017) found that Ps developed a deeper understanding of a lecture if they were instructed to 
relate that information to episodes from their own lives during a subsequent free recall task than 
if they were merely asked to free recall that information.  Jensen, McDaniel, Woodard, and 
Kummer (2014) found that students, over the semester of an actual course, could better apply the 
course content to novel, high level inference questions on the final exam if their prior quizzes 
consisted of inference questions than if they consisted of memory-retrieval questions (see also 
Glass, 2009; McDaniel, Thomas, Agarwal, McDermott, & Roediger, 2013).  Lastly, and working 
in a slightly different tradition of research, Needham and Begg (1992) found that Ps were better 
able to solve a problem if they had earlier made inferences to solve an analogous problem than if 
they had been merely told the solution to that analogous problem (see also Darabi, Nelson, & 
Palanki, 2007).  Given the above research, along with metacomprehension considerations, it 
seems likely that answering inference questions should result in a forward effect on 
comprehension compared to answering memory questions.  However, to my knowledge, there 
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are no studies that have assessed whether some formats of inference questions are more 
conducive to understanding than others. 
I stated above that inferential questions will be particularly conducive to the elaboration 
of a situation model if they significantly improve the learner’s metacomprehension of that 
situation model.  From this, we can deduce that certain kinds of multiple-choice questions are 
likely better than are others for facilitating elaboration of the situation model.  For example, easy 
multiple-choice questions are unlikely to be beneficial in this regard.  Inferential multiple-choice 
questions can, however, easily alert learners to deficiencies in their situation model if each 
answer choice is accompanied by a sensible argument for it.  Indeed, there is research showing 
the benefits of presenting correct information together with (and sometimes in dialogue with) 
incorrect information that contradicts it.  In fact, the point of including this incorrect information 
is to confuse the learner, at least initially, for that confusion will drive further reflection 
(D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014).   
For example, D’Mello et al. (2014) had Ps listen to two computer personalities discuss 
concepts in research methods.  Ps were better able to answer an inference question on a research 
methods concept if the two personalities argued while discussing the concept than if they were in 
agreement while discussing it.  Similar studies have found this method helpful for teaching 
decimals (Durkin & Rittle-Johnson, 2012) as well as introductory physics (Muller, Bewes, 
Sharma, & Reimann, 2008).  Inferential multiple-choice questions can function in a similar way 
if each answer choice is accompanied by an argument for it.  There will then be a set of 
arguments contradicting each other, which will cause confusion if each argument seems, on the 
surface, reasonable.  This confusion, of course, should be a strong metacomprehension indicator 
that the relevant situation model requires further elaboration.  It seems that inference multiple-
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choice questions that do not provide arguments for each answer choice, along with inference 
short-answer questions, will be less effective because they do not present contradictory 
arguments. 
Overview of the Experiments 
The following experiments examine the forward effect of testing using inference 
questions.  In particular, I am interested in determining if test questions over one set of 
information can improve one’s ability to understand—and not just remember—new (and related) 
information that is presented after the test.  It was earlier argued that such a forward effect will 
likely be obtained if there is a backward effect of testing.  One’s understanding of the subsequent 
chapters will be more facilitated if the test significantly improved one’s understanding of the first 
chapter than if it only improved one’s memory of it.  Test questions can improve one’s 
understanding of that text if they provide accurate metacomprehension feedback about parts of 
the respective situation model that are currently deficient or unspecified, for then one will be 
driven to reflect more about those parts of the situation model and remedy those deficiencies.  
Inference questions will likely give better metacomprehension feedback than will memory 
questions, and so result in a greater forward effect on comprehension.  Similarly, inference 
multiple-choice questions should also have a greater forward effect of testing when each answer-
choice is accompanied by an argument as opposed to when they are not.   
The same basic procedure was used across four experiments.  In the first two 
experiments, Ps began by reading a text describing the interference theory of forgetting.  Half of 
the Ps then reread that text, whereas the other half took an inference test over that first text.  All 
Ps then proceeded to read a text over the inhibition theory of forgetting, which is a more recent 
theory that in many ways built on interference theory.  All Ps next took an inference test over 
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both theories.  Each question on this final test requires Ps to use and integrate information from 
both the first and the second text.  It was hypothesized that the Ps who take a test over the first 
text would do better on the final test than would the Ps who reread the first text.  It was also 
hypothesized that Ps in the Testing condition would report less mind-wandering than would Ps in 
the Rereading condition, as was found in Szpunar et al. (2014). 
In the third experiment, there was no a rereading group.  Rather, there was a group of Ps 
who took a memory test over the first text.  It was hypothesized that the Ps who took an initial 
inference test would perform better on the final inference test than would Ps who took an initial 
memory test.  In the final experiment, all Ps took an inference test over the first text.  For half of 
the Ps, the inference test was multiple-choice and each answer was accompanied by an 
argument; the other Ps answered the same questions, but the answer-choices were not 
accompanied by arguments.   It was hypothesized that Ps would perform better on the final test if 
the initial test had arguments than if it did not. 
Experiment 1  
Participants 
 Ninety-one undergraduates (43 women) from the University of Oklahoma participated in 
Experiment 1.  There were an additional 4 Ps who had to be excluded from analysis because they 
did not complete the study.  Ps ranged from 18 to 47 years of age (M = 19.7).  The Ps were 
predominantly White (73.6%), with the remaining Ps being American Indian or Native American 
(8.8%), Asian (6.6%), Black or African American (7.7%), Middle-Eastern (1.1%) and not 
reporting (2.2%).  Ps received class credit for participating 
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Design 
A 2-group (Rereading condition; Testing condition) between-subjects design was used.   
Procedure 
All Ps began by reading a text over the interference theory of forgetting (see Appendix 
A).  The instructions at the beginning of this text informed them that they may be quizzed over 
the material in the text.  Ps were then randomly assigned to either the Testing condition or the 
Rereading condition.  Ps in the Rereading condition proceeded to reread the text over the 
interference theory of forgetting, whereas Ps in the Testing condition proceeded to take a 5-
question test over that text.  All Ps were next presented with the second text, which covered the 
inhibition theory of forgetting, and then took a 5-question test over it afterwards.  Lastly, Ps 
answered questions about their mind-wandering throughout the study.  There were no delays 
between any of these phases of the experiment. 
Material 
All material was presented to the Ps via the Qualtrics internet platform. 
Texts. The text over the interference theory of forgetting was 2158 words in length and 
written at a twelfth-grade reading level according to Flesch-Kinkaid software.  The text over the 
inhibition theory of forgetting was 1710 words in length and was also written at a twelfth-grade 
reading level according to Flesch-Kinkaid software.1  Prior studies have used material of 
comparable length and difficulty (e.g., Butler, 2010; Jing et al., 2014; Kang, McDermott, & 
Roediger, 2007).  Furthermore, a text needs to have a sufficient amount of complexity in order 
for there to be a significant distinction between its text-base and its situation model (Wiley et al., 
2005). Each of the two texts was broken into segments, and Ps could only view one segment at a 
time.  Ps had to view each segment for a certain amount of time before they could progress to the 
next segment.  The time minima were, roughly, 15s less than the amount of time it takes to read 
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the text aloud at a normal pace.  The specific time minima are reported in Appendix A.  When Ps 
in the Reread condition reread the first text, the time minima were retained and a 10-min time-
limit was added. 
Inference Questions. Two tests were constructed, one over the interference theory and 
one over the inhibition theory.  The questions required Ps to infer components of these theories 
that were only implicit in the texts, and not explicitly stated.  Such inference questions are 
necessary if one wants to assess how well Ps have constructed the situation model described in a 
text (Kintsch, 1994; Kintsch, 2005).  Both tests consisted of five questions, which is sufficient to 
assess how well Ps have constructed the situation model described in a text (Weaver, 1990).  The 
questions were multiple-choice, with four answer-choices per question.  Each answer-choice was 
accompanied by a supporting argument.  The supporting arguments were meant to cause 
confusion and metacognitive awareness of deficiencies of the Ps’ understanding of the material 
being tested.  Consequently, these accompanying arguments were meant to facilitate further 
construction of the situation model described in the texts.  On each question, Ps had 12 “points” 
which they were to distribute among the answer-choices.  If a P is certain that a particular choice 
is correct, then he or she should give all 12 points to that choice.  However, if that P is uncertain 
which of two choices is correct, then he could give each choice 6 points.  Using this “confidence-
weighted testing” has been found increase the degree to which Ps consider all of the available 
choices (Sparck, Bjork, & Bjork, 2016).  However many points a P allots to the correct answer of 
a given question was the number of points that he/she scored on that question2.  Hence, the 
highest possible score for each test was 60.  Ps were told the correct answer to each question 
immediately after having answered it.  Lastly, Ps had to spend a certain minimum amount of 
time on each question.  The time minima were roughly the amount of time it takes to read aloud 
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the question and answers-choices at a normal pace.  The specific time minima are reported in 
Appendix B. 
Trick Question.  In the final test, there was a trick question in addition to the five 
inference questions.  Within the middle of the trick question, Ps were explicitly told “Pick the 
third answer.” Failure to pick the third answer can serve as an indicator that the P was not fully 
reading the questions on the final test. 
Mind-Wandering Questions.  Ps were asked “How much did your mind wander while 
reading these texts on forgetting?” and “How much did your mind-wandering increase as you 
progressed through these texts on forgetting,” with Likert scales ranging from 1 (“Not at all”) to 
7 (“Very Much”).  See Szpunar et al. (2013) for a similar procedure.  Additionally, I asked Ps 
how interesting the second text was relative to the first test, using a Likert scale ranging from -2 
(“Much less interesting”) to +2 (“Much more interesting”). 
Results 
 Average time spent on the experiment was 41 min.  Ps in the Testing condition on 
average scored 26.7 out of 60 (SD = 11.9) on the test over the first text.  There was no significant 
difference between the proportion of Ps in the Testing condition who correctly answered the trick 
question (.40, 95% CI [.26, .54]) and the proportion of Ps in the Rereading condition who 
correctly answered the trick question (.52, 95% CI [.37, .67]), z = 1.13, p = .26 (two-tailed).  
Similarly, there was no significant difference between the two groups with respect to time spent 
reading the second text, t(89) = .38, p = .25.  However, Ps in the Rereading condition did spend 
more time taking the final test (M = 747.0s, SD = 130) than did Ps in the Testing condition (M = 
671.2s, SD = 130.1), t(89) = 3.1, p = .003 (two-tailed, equal variances not assumed).  
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 Contrary to my first hypothesis, Ps in the Testing condition did not score higher on the 
final test (M = 18.6; SD = 9.0) than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 19.1, SD = 11.2; see 
Figure 1).  To further investigate the data, I scored Ps’ test performances in two other ways.  In 
both cases, I eliminated Ps’ weightings.  In the first case, Ps could get 1 point on a problem if 
they allotted more of their 12 points to the correct answer than to any of the incorrect answers; 
otherwise, they received a score of 0.  Hence, across the five problems, the highest score Ps 
could achieve was a 5.  I will refer to this measure as the number of problems answered 
correctly.  Taking this approach, Ps in the Rereading condition again did not score lower (M = 
1.0, SD = 1.2) than did Ps in the Testing condition (M = .90, SD = .87), which was contrary to 
my hypothesis (see Figure 2).  My final way of scoring Ps’ performances was to give them 1 
point on each problem in which they did not give any evidence that they thought the correct 
answer was a good answer.  Specifically, a P received 1 point on a problem if he/she ranked the 
correct choice as least likely (i.e., gave fewer points to that answer than to any of the other, 
incorrect answers), or if he/she evenly distributed the 12 points amongst the 4 answer-choices.  A 
P therefore receives 1 point on a problem if he/she is “dead wrong,” but otherwise receives 0 
points.  I will refer to this measure as the number of problems answered incorrectly.  Ps in the 
Testing condition did not answer less problems incorrectly (M = 2.8, SD = 1.1) than did Ps in the 
Rereading condition (M = 2.3, SD = 1.3), which was again contrary to my hypothesis (see Figure 
3). 
 The Ps’ pattern of performance was not changed when analyses were limited to only the 
Ps who correctly answered the trick question.  Ps in the Testing condition again did not score 
higher on the final test (M = 16.6, SD = 6.5) than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 19.8, 
SD = 10.8).  Ps in the Testing condition also did not get more problems correct (M = 1, SD = .7) 
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than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 1.2, SD = 1.2).  Finally, Ps in the Testing condition 
did not get fewer problems incorrect (M = 3.1, SD = .8) than did Ps in the Rereading condition 
(M = 2.3, SD = 1.1). 
 Contrary to my second hypothesis, Ps in the testing group did not report less mind-
wandering (M = 4.5, SD = 1.3) than did Ps in the rereading group (M = 4.8, SD = 1.5), t(88) = 
.92, p = .36, nor did they report less of an increase in mind-wandering as the study progressed (M 
= 5.2, SD = 1.3) than did Ps in the rereading group (M  = 5.3, SD = 1.3), t(88) = .92, p = .55.  On 
a related note, there was no significant difference between how interesting (relative to the first 
text) Ps in the testing condition found the second text (M = -.67, SD = 1.1) and how interesting 
Ps in the rereading condition found the second text (M = .82, SD = 1.1), t(67) = .61, p = .54.  
This data is presented in Table 1. 
 A final measure of interest is point-distribution, which is the average number of choices 
among which a P distributed his/her points on a given problem.  For example, a P who allotted 
all 12 of his points to a single answer choice on each of the 5 problems would have a point-
distribution score of 1.  Across all 5 problems, Ps could distribute their points across a maximum 
number of 20 answer-choices (4 for each of the 5 questions).  This measure can be indicative of 
various characteristics, such as how well the P knew the material or how much the P considered 
each of the alternatives.  Determining how to interpret point-distribution scores is moot in this 
case, as there was no significant difference in point-distribution between the rereading condition 
(M = 2.6, SD = .95) and the testing condition (M = 2.5, SD = 1.1), t(89) = .81, p = .42. 
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Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, with minor changes meant to address 
the fact that in Experiment 1, (a) Ps in the testing condition spent less time taking the final test 
than Ps in the rereading condition, suggesting greater fatigue in the testing condition than in the 
rereading condition, and (b) the proportion of responses to the trick question that were correct 
was very low, suggesting fatigue in general across the two groups.  To address these issues, the 
texts were altered to be shorter and to have a lower reading level.  The time minima on the texts 
were also reduced in order to reduce the amount of waiting time.  The concern here was the Ps in 
Experiment 1 may have gotten bored waiting for the next button to appear.  The trick question 
was also altered to be more explicitly a trick question.  Additionally, each test question was 
changed to have only three answer-choices as opposed to four, thereby making them easier to 
answer.  I again hypothesized that (1) the testing group would score higher on the final test than 
would the rereading group and (2) that the testing group would report less mind-wandering than 
would the rereading group.   
Participants 
Sixty-seven undergraduates (51 women) from the University of Oklahoma participated in 
Experiment 2.  They ranged from 18 to 22 years of age (M = 18.5).  The Ps were predominantly 
White (85.1%), with the remaining Ps being American Indian or Native American (6.0%), Asian 
(3.0%), Black or African American (4.5%), and not reporting (1.5%).  Ps received class credit 
for participating. 
There were 32 Ps randomly assigned to be in the Rereading condition and 35 Ps that were 
randomly assigned to be in the Testing condition.  Ps were asked if they had previously studied 
the science of memory, using a Likert scale ranging from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extensively”).  
There was no evidence that Ps in the Testing condition had studied the science of memory either 
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more or less (M = 1.2, SD = .93) than had Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 1, SD = .87), t(65) 
= .93, p = .41. 
Design 
A 2-group (Rereading condition; Testing condition) between-subjects design was used.3 
Procedures 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 1. 
Materials 
All material was presented to the Ps via the Qualtrics internet platform. 
Texts.  The text over the interference theory of forgetting was reduced from the 2158 
words in length down to 1546 words. The writing was also reduced from a twelfth-grade reading 
level down to a seventh-grade reading level, according to Flesch-Kinkaid software.  The text 
over the inhibition theory of forgetting was actually increased from 1710 words to 1750 words.  
However, the writing was reduced from a twelfth-grade reading level down to a reading level of 
8.6.  The texts were again divided into segments.  The time minimum for each segment was 
roughly 10s per paragraph.  See Appendix C for the texts as well as the time minima. 
Inference Questions.  The inference  questions were largely the same as those 
from Experiment 1, with the main difference being that each question now only had three 
answer-choices as opposed to four.  Some questions were also made less difficult.  Lastly, the 
time minima for the questions were lower than they were in Experiment 1.  See Appendix D for 
the questions as well as the time minima. 
Trick Questions.  In the final test, there was a trick question in addition to the five 
inference questions.  Within the middle of the trick question, Ps were explicitly told “This fourth 
question is a trick question, and I want you to give all twelve points to the third option.”  
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Mind-Wandering Questions.  The mind-wandering questions from Experiment 1 were 
retained.  However, Ps were additionally asked “Have you previously studied the science of 
memory?” with the Likert scale ranging from 0 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extensively”). 
Results 
 Ps on average spent 31 min on the experiment, which is roughly a .25 decrease from the 
average time spent in Experiment 1.  Ps in the Testing condition on average scored 34.3 out of 60 
(SD = 11.9) on the test over the first text.  Additionally, .62 of the Ps correctly answered the trick 
question (95% CI [.51, .75]). The difference between the proportion of Ps in the rereading group 
who correctly answered the trick question (.72, 95% CI [.57, .87]) and the proportion of Ps in the 
testing group who correctly answered the trick question (.54, 95% CI [.37, .72]) approached 
significance, z = 1.48, p = .068.  There was no evidence for a difference between the amount of 
time the Rereading condition spent on reading the second text (M = 487s, SD = 116) and the 
amount of time the Testing condition spent on the second text (M = 490s, SD = 150), t(65) = -
.09, p = .46.  However, Ps in the Rereading condition did spend more time on the final test (M = 
607s, SD = 151.7) than did Ps in the Testing condition (M = 555s, SD = 122.4), t(65) = 2.87, p = 
.002 (two-tailed).  Lastly, Ps in the Testing condition on average scored 34.2 out of 60 (SD = 
11.9) on the test over the first text.   
 Contrary to my first hypothesis, Ps in the Testing condition (M = 21.7, SD = 9.1) did not 
score higher on the final test than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 24.2, SD = 11.2; see 
Figure 1). Ps in the Testing condition also did not get more problems correct (M = 1.31, SD = 
.90) than did those in the Rereading condition (M = 1.44, SD = 1.19; see Figure 2).  Lastly, Ps in 
the Testing condition—again, contrary to my hypothesis—did not get fewer problems incorrect 
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on the final test (M = 2.66, SD = 1.08) than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 2.06, SD = 
1.01; see Figure 3). 
 The pattern of P performance was not changed when only Ps who correctly answered the 
trick question were taken into account.  Ps in the Testing condition still did not score higher (M = 
21.1, SD = 11.0) than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 24.7, SD = 10.9).  Similarly, Ps in 
the Testing condition did not answer more questions correctly (M = 1.3, SD = 1.0) than did Ps in 
the Rereading condition (M = 1.5, SD = 1.1).  Lastly, Ps in the Testing condition did not get 
fewer questions incorrect (M = 2.7, SD = 1.2) than did Ps in the Rereading condition (M = 2.0, 
SD = 1.0).  
 Contrary to my second hypothesis, Ps in the Rereading condition did not report more 
mind-wandering (M = 4.50, SD = 1.39) than did those in the Testing condition (M = 4.97, SD = 
1.39), and they also did not report a greater increase in mind-wandering as the study progressed 
(M = 4.56, SD = 1.58) than did Ps in the Testing condition (M = 5.54, SD = 1.12).  On a related 
note, there was no significant evidence that Ps in the testing group found the second text less 
interesting (M = -.22, SD = .98) than did Ps in the rereading group (M  = -.37, SD = 1.1), t(65) = 
.59, p = .56.  A succinct representation of this data is available in Table 2. 
 A final measure of interest was point-distribution, which was the average number of 
choices among which a P distributed his/her points on a given problem. Ps in the Testing 
condition distributed their points amongst fewer of the 15 answer-choices (3 for each of the 5 
questions; M = 7.60, SD = 2.45) than did Ps in the rereading condition (M = 8.81, SD = 2.57), 
t(65) = 1.98, p = .052.  Given the prior analyses already done, this most recent comparison 
suggests that Ps in the testing condition spent less effort comparing the plausibility of the various 
answer choices on a given problem.  
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Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the exception of two changes.  First, the 
Rereading condition was dropped and replaced by a Memory Testing condition.  Ps in this 
condition answered questions over the interference text after they first finished reading that text, 
as opposed to proceeding to read that text again.  The test questions were in multiple-choice 
format and asked them about concepts explicitly described in the text.  One potential issue is the 
fact that Ps in the Inference Testing condition were exposed to information that Ps in the 
Memory Testing condition were not, viz., the correct answers to the inference questions over the 
first text.  Ps in the Inference Testing condition are exposed to this information regardless of 
whether they correctly answer the questions because they receive feedback immediately after 
answering each question.  However, this benefit seems to be a natural extension of answering 
inference questions.  Given that positive effects of answering questions are hard to detect (see 
Experiments 1-2), it did not seem desirable to eliminate this benefit of answering inference 
questions and thereby further increase the difficulty of detecting the possible positive effects of 
answering inference questions.  The second change was that half of the Ps were told at the 
beginning of the experiment that their task was to memorize the texts as best they could, whereas 
the other Ps were told that their task was to understand the texts as best they could and that 
quizzes would test their understanding of the texts as opposed to their memory for the texts.   
There were two hypotheses in this experiment.  The first hypothesis was that Ps in the Inference 
Testing condition would perform better on the final test than would Ps in the Memory Testing 
conditi on.  The second hypothesis was that Ps in the Comprehension Instruction condition 
would score better on the final test than would Ps in the Memory Instruction condition.  The 
logic driving this second hypothesis is that test-expectancy would drive Ps in the Comprehension 
Instruction condition to more closely read and think through, at the very least, the first text. 
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Participants 
Ninety-six undergraduates (66 women) from the University of Oklahoma participated in 
Experiment 3.  They ranged from 18 to 21 years of age (M = 18.6).  The Ps were predominantly 
White (81%), with the remaining Ps being American Indian or Native American (3.1%), Asian 
(10.4%), Black or African American (3.1%), Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (1.0%), 
and not reporting (1.0%).  Ps received class credit for participating. 
It is important to note that Ps who took the inference test reported a degree of prior 
exposure to the science of memory, on a scale from 0 to 4, that was not significantly different (M 
= 1.7, SD = .9) from that reported by the Ps who took the memory test (M = 1.5, SD = 1.0), t(94) 
= 1.03, p = .31 (two-tailed).   
Design 
A 2(Inference Testing, Memory Testing)  2(Comprehension Instruction, Memory 
Instruction) between-subjects design was used.  There were 28 Ps in the Inference Testing 
condition who received the comprehension instruction, 23 Ps in the Inference Testing condition 
who received the memory instruction, 20 Ps in the Memory Testing condition who received the 
comprehension instruction, and 25 Ps in the Memory Testing condition who received the 
memory instruction.  
Procedures 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1.  The only difference was that, at beginning 
of the experiment, each P was told either: 
“Quizzes will test your COMPREHENSION of the presented information rather than 
your MEMORY of it.  What this means is that the right answer to each question will 
have never been explicitly stated in the text; rather, you must understand the information 
well enough to be able to apply it to the quiz questions.” 
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or “Quizzes will test your MEMORY for information explicitly stated in the texts.” 
Material 
All material was presented to the Ps via the Qualtrics internet platform. 
Texts.  The texts were the same as those used in Experiment 2.   
Inference Questions.  The inference questions were the same as those used in 
Experiment 2.  The memory questions were in the same format as the inference questions.  The 
only difference between the two types of questions was that the memory questions were 
answered directly in the texts whereas the inference questions were not (See Appendix D). 
Trick Question.  The trick question was the same as in Experiment 2.  
Mind-Wandering Questions.  The post-test questions from Experiment 2 were retained. 
Results 
 Ps on average spent 29 min on the experiment (SD = 6.2).  Ps in the Memory Testing 
condition on average scored a 36.2 out of 60 (SD = 13.0) on the first test; Ps in the Inference 
Testing condition on average scored a 24.3 out of 60 (SD = 11.3).  Fifty-three percent of the Ps 
correctly answered the trick question (95% CI [.43, 63]).  There was no significant evidence that 
Ps who took the memory test correctly answered the trick question at a higher frequency (.60, 
95% CI [.45, .75]) than did Ps who took the inference test (.47, 95% CI [.33, .51]), z = 1.27, p = 
.20 (two-tailed).  Ps who took a memory test spent more time reading the second text (M = 
514.4s; SD = 105.3) than did Ps who took an inference test (M = 443.2s; SD = 126.8), t(94) = 
2.97, p = .004 (two-tailed).  However, there was no evidence that Ps who took the memory test 
spent a different amount of time on the final test (M = 485.9s; SD = 91.8) than did Ps who took 
the inference test (M = 496.0s; SD = 122.2), t(94) = .45, p = .65.   
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 Contrary to my first hypothesis, Ps did not score higher on the final test when they took 
an initial inference test (M = 23.0, SD = 10.5) than when they took an initial memory test (M = 
25.4, SD = 9.6; see Figure 1).  Scoring Ps’ final test scores in the alternative ways (outlined in 
the Results section of Experiment 1) did not reverse this trend (See Figures 2 and 3).  Contrary to 
my second hypothesis, Ps did not score higher when given the comprehension instruction (M = 
23.8, SD = 10.3), than when given the memory instruction (M = 24.5, SD = 10.0).  There was 
also no significant evidence of an interaction between testing condition and instruction condition, 
F (1, 69) = 1.6, p = .21. 
 The Ps’ pattern of performance looked largely the same when analyses were restricted to 
Ps who correctly answered the trick question.  Ps in the Comprehension condition still did not 
score higher on the final test (M = 24.0, SD = 12.5) than did Ps in the Memory condition (M = 
26, SD = 8.6).  Similarly, Ps in the Comprehension condition still not get fewer questions wrong 
(M = 2.4, SD = 1.0) than did Ps in the Memory condition (M = 2.2, SD = 1.0).  Ps in the 
Comprehension condition did numerically get more questions correct (M = 1.5, SD = 1.4) than 
did Ps in the Memory condition (M = 1.3, SD = 1.1), but this difference did not reach 
significance, t(49) = .7, p = .24. 
 There were no significant differences in interest of the second text [t(94) = 1.23, p = .22 
(two-tailed)], in mind-wandering [t(94) = .04, p = .97 (two-tailed)], in increases in mind-
wandering [t(94) = .96, p = .33 (two-tailed)], or in point-distribution [t(94) = .54, p = .59 (two-
tailed)].  Table 3 gives the relevant statistics. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 3 except the Memory Testing condition was 
dropped and replaced by an alternative inference testing condition.  In this new condition—the 
33 
 
Non-Argument Testing condition—Ps took an inference test over the first text, but the answer-
choices on this test were not accompanied by supporting arguments.  Thus, this test was different 
from the inference test over the first text that was used in Experiments 2 and 3.  On that latter 
test, the answer-choices were accompanied by supporting arguments.  Ps in the Argument 
Testing condition took this latter version of the test in Experiment 4. This difference with respect 
to the format of the inference test over the first text was the only point on which these two 
conditions differed.  It was hypothesized that those in the Argument Testing condition would 
score better on the final test than would Ps in the Non-Argument Testing condition. 
Participants 
One hundred and eight undergraduates (85 women) from the University of Oklahoma 
participated in Experiment 4.  They ranged from 18 to 23 years of age (M = 18.6).  The Ps were 
predominantly White (75%), with the remaining Ps being American Indian or Native American 
(5.6%), Asian (9.3%), Black or African American (4.6%), Middle-Eastern (1.9%), and not 
reporting (3.7%).  Ps received class credit for participating. 
It is important to note that Ps in the Argument Testing condition test reported a degree of 
prior exposure to the science of memory, on a scale from 0 to 4, that was not significantly 
different (M = 1.2, SD = 1.0) from that reported by the Ps in the Non-Argument Testing 
condition (M = 1.3, SD = 1.1), t(106) = .52, p = .61 (two-tailed).   
Design 
A 2(Argument Testing, Non-Argument Testing)  2(Comprehension Instruction, 
Memory Instruction) between-subjects design was used.  There were 28 Ps in the Non-Argument 
Testing condition who received the comprehension instruction, 27 Ps in the Non-Argument 
Testing condition who received the memory instruction, 27 Ps in the Argument Testing condition 
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who received the comprehension instruction, and 26 Ps in the Argument Testing condition who 
received the memory instruction.  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 3. 
Material 
All material was presented to the Ps via the Qualtrics internet platform. 
Texts.  The texts were the same as those used in Experiment 2.   
Test Questions.  The questions over the first text for Ps in the Argument Testing 
condition were the same as those used in Experiment 2.  The questions over the first text for Ps 
in the Non-Argument Testing condition were similar to those presented in the Argument Testing 
condition.  However, the answer-choices were not accompanied by arguments.  Also, in some 
cases the answer-choices were slightly altered, although questions themselves were always the 
same.   
The reason why some of the answer-choices had to be altered had to do with the fact that, 
on the test with accompanying arguments, the only difference between some answer-choices was 
a difference in supporting argument.  That is, two answer-choices sometimes had the same 
response, but the argument for one was inaccurate, and so the P had to choose the answer-choice 
that had both the correct response and the same argument.  Because there were no arguments 
present for Ps in the Non-Argument condition, there could be no two answer-choices for a given 
question that had the same response.  Hence, some of the answer-choices had to be changed for 
the Non-Argument test.  Importantly, Ps were shown the argument proving the correct answer as 
feedback immediately after answering each question. (See Appendix D). 
Trick Question.  The trick question was the same as in Experiment 2.  
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Mind-Wandering Questions.  The post-test questions from Experiment 2 were retained. 
Results 
Ps on average spent 24 min on the experiment (SD = 5.4).  Sixty-five percent of Ps 
correctly answered the trick question (95% CI [.56, .74]).  There was not significant evidence 
that Ps who took the test with arguments correctly answered the trick question at a different 
frequency (.65, 95% CI [.52, .78]) than did Ps who took the inference test without arguments 
(.66, 95% CI [.53, .79]), z = .09, p = .93 (two-tailed). 
 I ran a 2(Test: No-Argument, Argument)  2(Instruction: Memory, Comprehension) 
between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA), with test performance as the dependent 
variable.  There was some support for the primary hypothesis of Experiment 4.  Specifically, Ps 
did score marginally higher when the answer-choices of the initial test had arguments (M = 25.0, 
SD = 10.3) than when the answer-choices did not have arguments (M = 22.0, SD = 11.0), F (1, 
104) = 2.1, p = .077, Cohen’s d = .28 (see Figure 1).  I did not detect a difference in performance 
between Ps given the memory instruction (M = 24.8, SD = 10.9) and Ps given the comprehension 
instruction (M = 24.5, SD = 10.9), F (1, 104) = .05, p = .82.  Finally, I did not detect an 
interaction between the Test condition and the Instruction condition, F (1, 104) = .26, p = .61. 
 Alternative scoring did result in further support for the primary hypothesis.  Ps in the 
Argument Testing condition got marginally more questions correct (M = 1.4, SD = 1.2) than did 
Ps in the Non-Argument Testing condition (M = 1.1, SD = 1.2), F (1, 104) = 2.3, p = .068, 
Cohen’s d = .29 (see Figure 2).  Furthermore, Ps in the Argument Testing condition got 
significantly fewer problems incorrect (M = 2.3, SD = 1.0) than did Ps in the Non-Argument 
Testing condition (M = 2.7, SD = 1.3), F (1, 104) = 3.1, p = .04, Cohen’s d = .35, (see Figure 3). 
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 Ps who took an initial test with arguments did not differ from the other Ps with respect to 
time spent reading the second text [t(102) = .76, p = .45, (equal variance not assumed)], to time 
spent taking the final test [t(106) = 1.4, p = .15], to mind-wandering [t(106) = .71, p = .48], to 
prior knowledge [t(106) = .52, p = .61], to interest of the second text in comparison to the first 
text [t(106) = .88, p = .38], or to an increase in mind-wandering [t(106) = 1.8, p = .069] (see 
Table 4).  Additionally, there also seemed to be marginal evidence that Ps in the Argument 
Testing condition distributed their points less on the final test (M = 8.1, SD = 2.3) than did Ps in 
the Non-Argument Testing condition (M = 9.2, SD = 3.0), t(106) = 2.12, p = .036.  However, due 
to a Bonferroni correction that would lower the -threshold to around .007, it seems prudent to 
take this final analysis with caution.   
Discussion 
 In the current study, I tested a number of predictions about forward effects of testing.  
First, I hypothesized that taking an inference test over a text would result in better learning of a 
subsequent related text than would rereading that first text.  There were two primary reasons why 
I hypothesized that this would happen.  First, it has been found that taking a test improves one’s 
understanding of the material to a greater degree than does rereading that material (Hinze, et al., 
2013).  Second, W. Kintsch’s (1994) theory of comprehension states that one better comprehends 
a text when one has more background knowledge.  Thus, taking a test over a text should improve 
one’s ability to use that information as background knowledge when trying to learn a related 
topic.  I also hypothesized that taking a test over a text would result in less subsequent mind-
wander than would rereading that text, in accordance with prior research (Szpunar et al., 2013).  
My third hypothesis was that taking an inference test would result in a larger forward effect than 
would taking a memory test.  This hypothesis is suggested by the fact that inference tests have 
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been found to result in a better understanding of the tested material than have memory tests 
(Hinze et al., 2013) and because answering inference questions should result in better feedback 
regarding deficiencies in one’s understanding of the text than should memory questions (Thiede 
et al., 2010).  Lastly, I predicted that a greater forward effect of testing would be obtained when 
each of the answer-choices of the test are accompanied by an argument than when the answer-
choices are not accompanied by an argument.  Again, I assumed that answer-choices 
accompanied by arguments would be more metacognitively informative (and confusing, D’Mello 
et al., 2014) than would be answer-choices unaccompanied by arguments.  
The results of the current study were, for the most part, not as predicted.  Answering 
inference questions over a text did not result in better learning of a subsequent related text than 
did either rereading the first text (Experiments 1-2) or taking a memory test over the first text 
(Experiment 3).  However, answering inference questions in which each answer-choice was 
accompanied by an argument did result in marginally better understanding of the second text 
than did answering inference questions in which the answer-choices were not accompanied by an 
argument (Experiment 4).  Thus, Ps in 3 of the experiments did not seem to benefit from taking 
inference tests.    
 One explanation for the null results is that testing may mainly benefit the learning process 
by updating retrieved information with context elements, and not by fostering the integration of 
different bits of information.  This possibility is predicted by the ECA (Karpicke et al., 2014).  
However, the ECA was developed almost exclusively in the context of how testing improves 
memory, with comprehension receiving scant attention.  Furthermore, other research seems to 
strongly suggest (1) that testing has metacognitive benefits and (2) that such metacognitive 
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benefits result in better learning (e.g., Nguyen & McDaniel, 2015).  Thus, this explanation of the 
result does not seem likely.   
 A more likely explanation of the results has to do with the motivation of the Ps.  The Ps 
in these experiments were in no significant way required to learn the material well.  They merely 
had to finish their trial in order to receive course credit.  Hence, one of the major goals that 
drives student learning—receiving a high grade—was not present.  Goals are a very important 
factor in the learning process though, and setting specific goals has been found to increase effort 
(Bryan & Locke, 1967).  It seems that the effort of the Ps could have been better considering that 
the proportion of them who correctly answered the trick question ranged from 40-72% across the 
four experiments.  It should be noted, though, that interpretation of responses to the trick 
question is not as simple as one would like.  For example, in Experiment 4, the Ps in the 
Argument Testing condition who correctly answered the trick question performed worse on the 
final test than did Ps in the Argument Testing condition who did not correctly answer the trick 
question.  This was in part because the two Ps who scored highest on the final test did not 
correctly answer the trick question.  By contrast, the only P across all 4 experiments to score 0 
points on the final test did happen to answer the trick question correctly.  It cannot be gainsaid, 
though, that the Ps in the current study could have put forth greater effort and that this could 
have been facilitated by helping them to form goals (e.g., perform well enough to win a prize). 
Setting a specific goal is also associated with greater persistence (LaPorte & Nath, 1976).  
Persistence seemed to be an issue for the inference-testing group in particular, with those taking 
an inference test over the first text spending less time on the final test than those who reread the 
first text (Experiments 1 and 2) and less time reading the second text than did Ps who took a 
memory test over the first text (Experiment 3).  One interpretation of these low reading times is 
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that the Ps were simply trying to complete the experiment and were not worried about spending 
extra time trying to understand the content.  Perhaps, because taking an inference test is difficult, 
Ps must have persistence in order to benefit from taking that test.  However, the Ps in 
Experiment 4 complicate interpretation of reading times and test times.  The Argument Testing 
condition in Experiment 4 was the exact same as the Testing condition in Experiment 2 and the 
Inference Testing condition in Experiment 3.  Yet, the Ps in the Argument Testing condition of 
Experiment 4 not only scored numerically better on the final test than did their counterparts from 
Experiments 1 and 2; they also spent even less time on reading the second text and on taking the 
final test (see Tables 2-4).  It is still likely, nonetheless, that Ps are more likely to have their 
learning facilitated by test-taking when they have an actual goal of learning. 
      On a related note, interest has also been found to be an important factor in the learning 
process.  For example, students with a greater interest in a subject are better able to answer 
inference questions in that subject than are students with less interest (Schiefele, 1992, 
Experiment 1).  Students with more interest in a topic also tend have higher levels of energy, to 
make more elaborations (e.g., comparing information in the topic to personal experience or 
generating content-related images), and to experience greater amounts of flow (Schiefele, 1992, 
Experiment 2).   
From Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, I tried to improve the interest of the texts in a 
couple ways.  First, I reduced the time minima accompanying each text section and each test 
question.  The relatively lengthy time minima used in Experiment 1 were meant to stimulate 
additional thinking.  However, after I observed a null-result in Experiment 1, I assumed that Ps 
likely were spending that additional time merely waiting for the “Next” button to appear, with 
that waiting resulting in boredom and disinterest.  Second, I reduced the length of the first text.  
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Third, I significantly reduced the reading level of the texts.  It was hoped that this would lower 
the likelihood of a P becoming disengaged from the task due to its difficulty.  Finally, I also tried 
to make the content of the texts somewhat more engaging.  Another possible avenue explorable 
by future studies is figuring out which study domains are generally considered to be highly 
interesting.  (An analysis of text-dependency was also started.  See Appendix E for preliminary 
results). 
Of course, a given text will not seem equally interesting to everybody.  The Ps in 
Experiment 4 may in fact have found the materials used in the current study to be more 
interesting than did Ps in the first 3 Experiments.  Again, the Argument Testing condition in 
Experiment 4 was the exact same as the Testing condition in Experiment 2 and the Inference 
Testing condition in Experiment 3.  Nonetheless, Ps in the Argument Testing condition in 
Experiment 4 scored numerically better than those respective Ps in Experiments 2 and 3. (Of 
course, cross-experiment statistical analyses cannot be conducted, and so we cannot know if 
these differences were likely due merely to chance).  At the same time, Ps in the Argument 
Testing condition of Experiment 4 reported numerically less prior exposure to the science of 
memory than did the respective Ps from Experiments 2 and 3.  It seems unlikely therefore that 
the Ps in Experiment 4 had more experience with the science of memory.  On the other hand, the 
Ps in the Argument condition of Experiment 4 also reported numerically less of an increase in 
mind-wandering than did the respective Ps from Experiments 2 and 3, which suggests that the Ps 
in Experiment 4 may have found the material to be more interesting (see Tables 2-4).  Ps in 
Experiment 4 may have benefited from the argument-included inference tests because they had 
enough interest to (a) work on the deficiencies in their understanding of the first text that became 
apparent during their test over that text and (b) try to understand the more difficult second text. 
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 It has already been suggested above that one way to improve the effort of Ps in studies 
similar to the current one is to choose topics that are more popular.  Another suggestion might be 
to break up the study into multiple days.  Answering inference questions is difficult (Jensen et 
al., 2014), and it is therefore not surprising (in retrospect) that the group that had to answer 
inference questions either spent less time reading the second text (Experiment 3) or taking the 
final test (Experiments 1 and 2) than did the comparison group.  Answering the inference 
questions seems to have fatigued Ps, which is why splitting the experiment up across multiple 
days may be a good idea, for that would allow the Ps to rejuvenate. 
The current study was conducted mainly out of pedagogical concerns.  Many researchers 
have argued recently for an increase in the use of tests in education (e.g., Dunlosky et al., 2013), 
but it is important to consider what kinds of tests are most beneficial to students.  I have argued 
that tests which consist primarily of memory questions are problematic because they result in 
untoward test-expectancy effects (McDaniel et al., 1994), such that students spend their study 
time trying to maximize the number of details memorized rather than trying maximize their 
general understanding of the topic.  In fact, it seems that students may have confusion about 
whether or not there is any difference between memory and understanding (Jensen et al., 2014).  
Thus, it seems imperative that inference questions be used on tests with a relatively high degree 
of frequency.  The question, though, is whether certain kinds of inference questions are more 
beneficial than others.  Results from Experiment 4 suggests that inference-based multiple-choice 
question have a greater forward-effect on future learning when each answer-choice is 
accompanied by an argument.  Nonetheless, much further research into this topic must be done. 
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Endnotes 
 1Flesch-Kindaid software calculates the reading level of a text with an equation that takes 
into account average sentence length and average word length.  See 
https://www.webpagefx.com/tools/read-able/flesch-kincaid.html. 
 2One issue that was noticed only on the penultimate day of testing was that a P can, in 
some circumstances, see how many points prior Ps assigned to each answer-choice.  It is not 
clear how this would affect performance, as each answer-choice was assigned many points by 
some prior Ps and few points by others. 
 3In Experiment 2, Ps were to receive either the Memory instruction or the Comprehension 
instruction, as described in the methods section of Experiment 3.  However, due to a 
programming error, all of the first half of the Ps only received one of these two instructions.  
Thus, the instruction variable was not taken into account in the analyses of Experiment 2.  It is 
important to note that the instruction variable was in no way confounded with the testing 
variable. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1 
 
 
Note.  The standard deviations are provided within the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2 
 
 
Condition n Time on Text 2 Time on Final 
Test 
Mind-
Wandering 
Increase in 
Mind-Wandering 
Interest in Text 2 Point Distribution 
 
Rereading 
 
44 
 
663.0s (62.1) 
 
747.0s (130.1) 
 
4.8 (1.5) 
 
5.3 (1.3) 
 
-.82 (1.06) 
 
10.5 (3.8) 
 
Testing 
 
47 
 
677.2s (88.5) 
 
671.2s (100.0) 
 
4.6 (1.3) 
 
5.2 (1.3) 
 
-.67 (1.08) 
 
9.9 (4.2) 
Condition n Time on Text 2 Time on Final 
Test 
Mind-
Wandering 
Increase in Mind-
Wandering 
Interest 
in Text 2 
Prior 
Knowledge 
Point 
Distribution 
 
Rereading 
 
32 
 
486.7s (114.5) 
 
607.2s (151.7) 
 
4.5 (1.4) 
 
4.6 (1.6) 
 
-.22 (1.0) 
 
1.0 (1.0) 
 
8.9 (2.6) 
 
Testing 
 
35 
 
489.8s (147.9) 
 
555.2s (122.4) 
 
5.0 (1.3) 
 
5.5 (1.1) 
 
-.37 (1.1) 
 
1.2 (.9) 
 
7.6 (2.5) 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 3 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 4 
 
 
Condition n Time on Text 
2 
Time on Final 
Test 
Mind-
Wandering 
Increase in 
Mind-Wandering 
Interest 
in Text 2 
Prior 
Knowledge 
Point 
Distribution 
 
Memory 
 
45 
 
514.4s (105.3) 
 
485.9s (90.8) 
 
4.9 (1.4) 
 
5.3 (1.4) 
 
-.31 (1.2) 
 
1.5 (1.0) 
 
8.4 (2.7) 
 
Comprehension 
 
51 
 
443.2s (125.6) 
 
496.0s (121.0) 
 
4.9 (1.5) 
 
5.5 (1.5) 
 
-.61 (1.1) 
 
1.7 (.9) 
 
8.7 (2.8) 
Condition n Time on Text 2 Time on Final 
Test 
Mind-
Wandering 
Increase in Mind-
Wandering 
Interest 
in Text 2 
Prior 
Knowledge 
Point 
Distribution 
 
Non-Argument 
 
55 
 
437.3s (126.1) 
 
508.3s (142.4) 
 
4.7 (1.6) 
 
5.4 (1.4) 
 
-.47 (1.1) 
 
1.25 (1.1) 
 
9.2 (3.0) 
 
Argument 
 
53 
 
421.7s (100.5) 
 
475.5s (87.8) 
 
4.5 (1.6) 
 
4.8 (1.7) 
 
-.28 (1.2) 
 
1.15 (1.0) 
 
8.1 (2.3) 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.  Average scores on the final test are shown.  With this scoring method, Ps earned points according to how many of their 12 
points they allotted to the correct answer.  If a P allotted 7 of his/her 12 points to the correct answer on a given question, then 7 points 
were earned for that question.  Across the 5 questions on the final test, Ps could earn a maximum total of 60 points. 
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Figure 2.  Presented is the average number of problems answered correctly on the final test.  With this scoring method, a P was said to 
have correctly answered a question if the correct answer—relative to the other answer-choices—received the greatest proportion of the 
P’s 12 points.  The maximum possible score was a 5. 
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Figure 3.  Presented is the average number of problems answered incorrectly on the final test.  With this scoring method, a P was said 
to have incorrectly answered a question if the correct answer—relative to the other answer-choices—received the smallest proportion 
of the P’s 12 points or if the P even distributed the 12 points amongst all the answer-choices.  The worst possible score was a 5. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1: Text 1 
Section 1 (Minimum time = 7s) 
Everyone is familiar with the process of remembering, with students in particular being 
frustrated by it and its limitations.  Nevertheless, scientists are beginning to discover that such 
forgetting is possibly adaptive; they are of course also learning that the processes of 
remembering and forgetting have features that no one would have predicted.  This article will 
cover these features and crucial experiments that have shed light on these questions. 
 
Section 2 (Minimum time = 25s) 
There are a number of basic assumptions made in the science of memory.  For example, it 
is assumed that the act of remembering is a cue-driven process.  This means that when you 
remember, say, that you have been meaning to call your mother, you do not just remember this 
out of the blue.  Rather, you were thinking about something else which reminded you to call your 
mother.  For example, a colleague may have been talking to you about his or her own mother, 
and that served as a reminder (or as a “cue”).  Or perhaps that colleague brings a Red Bull into 
work that day, and this reminds you to call your mother, for your mother drinks Red Bull every 
day.  In an event, for you to remember to call your mother, you must first be thinking about 
something else that reminds you to call her. 
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Section 3 (Minimum time = 40s) 
It should be noted that the cue which reminds you of some memory must have a 
connection to that memory in your mental system.  Thinking about the foundation plan of a 
house, for example, is unlikely to make you think about milk, nor is thinking about the cookies 
you’re eating likely to remind you of different possible roof plans.  However, thinking about the 
cookies you’re eating can clearly remind you of milk.  This is because you have some associative 
link connecting your mental representations (or memories) of milk and of cookies.  However, 
most of us have not created an association between cookies and roof plans, and so thinking about 
the one will not cause us to think about the other (that is, unless you developed a habit of eating 
cookies on the roof so that, like an adolescent smoker, you can avoid being caught by your 
family).  Now consider how thinking about Oklahoma might remind us of its NBA team (the 
Thunder), of its best restaurant (Victoria’s Pasta), or of tornadoes.  We can only remember one 
thing at a time.  So, what will we be reminded of first whenever we think about Oklahoma? 
 
Section 4 (Minimum time = 60s) 
Psychologists have classically assumed that 2 factors determine the course of the 
memory-retrieval process: association strength and trace strength.  (“Trace” is here being used in 
the sense of a “memory trace,” as when we say that we have information about water stored in 
one memory trace and information about fire stored in a different memory trace).  The concepts 
of association strength and trace strength can be illustrated by thinking about Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Ronald Reagan.  Most people know that both of these men were involved in 
politics as well as in the movie industry.  For us to have this knowledge entails that the memory 
of each man is associated both to our thoughts and memories on politics as well as to those on 
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movies.  Nevertheless, thinking about Schwarzenegger is more likely to remind you of his 
movies than of his political career, whereas thinking about Reagan is more likely to remind you 
of his political career than of his acting career.  Clearly, our memory trace for Schwarzenegger 
has a greater association strength to our movie memories than to our politic memories, whereas 
the opposite is true for the Reagan memory trace.  We see something similar when we consider 
how thinking about IHOP is more likely to remind us of breakfast food than of burgers, whereas 
thinking about MacDonald’s is more likely to remind us of burgers than of breakfast food.  Of 
course, the thought of MacDonald’s is still more likely to remind people of breakfast food than it 
is to remind them of the hula burger, even for people who have actually eaten the hula burger 
(yes, I will explain what a hula burger is in a minute).  Part of the explanation is that most 
people’s memory for hula burgers have incredibly weak trace strength, a concept that we will 
now elaborate on. 
 
Section 5 (Minimum time = 25s) 
The hula burger was a non-meat option that MacDonald’s offered in order to reach out to 
Catholics, for Catholics abstain from meat on Friday’s during the season of Lent.  Hence, the 
Catholic could in good conscience order the hula burger, which had patties consisting of a 
mixture of cheese and pineapple.  Because most people found this concoction rather 
unappetizing, it was quickly pulled from the menu, back in the 70’s.  Thus, people who have 
eaten it probably have not thought about it in 40 years.  The memory has thus begun to fade.  We 
have all experienced this with our school lessons as well—we might know our chemistry for the 
chemistry final, but have a hard time remembering that information once a year passes.  The 
trace strength has weakened, but what exactly does this mean? 
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Section 6 (Minimum time = 40s) 
One of the earlier ideas about what it is for a memory’s trace strength to weaken was that 
the memory itself is decaying, thereby making it harder to “read” or to “see” the information 
contained in the memory.  This conception was already present in Plato’s writings (more than 
2,000 years ago) and was still present during the dawn of the scientific study of psychology (a 
little over 100 years ago).  However, a more useful analogy for our purposes is to think of each 
memory as having a light bulb hanging over it.  These bulbs are special in that they have no ‘off’ 
switch, and are continuously turned on.  If the light bulb is sufficiently bright, then you can read 
or see the content contained in the memory.  However, with time, the bulb’s battery will get used 
up and lose its ‘trace strength,’ causing the bulb to gradually get dimmer.  Now, it seems (to pick 
back up our prior example) that as long as you are studying your chemistry, the light bulbs 
illuminating your chemistry memories do not get very dim.  Why is this so?  To better 
understand this, we will have to look deeper into the concept of association strength. 
 
Section 7 (Minimum time = 50s) 
I mentioned that thinking about MacDonald’s is more likely to make you think of burgers 
than of, say, hash browns.  But how come thinking about MacDonald’s never causes you to think 
about thermo-nuclear fusion?  Psychologists often think of it this way:  When we process a 
memory (MacDonald’s), we charge its trace strength.  (Similarly, you charge your car battery 
whenever you run the engine).  This incoming mental “electricity” does not stay contained in that 
cue memory, but spreads along links to associated memories.  The incoming electricity will 
make the light bulb of an associated memory brighter, and possibly bright enough for us to read 
the content of that memory.  Non-associated memories (like thermos-nuclear fusion) will not 
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receive any of the electricity because they are not connected to the cue memory.  Memories that 
are connected to the cue memory, but that have really dim bulbs, will require substantial 
processing of the cue in order get enough electricity for the memory to be recalled.  This 
partially—but only partially—explains why we have a hard time remembering chemistry facts 
when we have gone a year without studying chemistry.  However, if you never stop studying 
chemistry, then you continuously recharge the bulbs of your chemistry memories.  But as I said, 
decrease in trace strength is not the major cause of our forgetting. 
 
Section 8 (Minimum time = 60s) 
Memory researchers have traditionally argued that it is not so much the passage of time 
that causes us to forget, but rather the learning of new information.  Whenever you access a 
memory, thereby charging it, there is a fixed amount of electricity that it spreads in a given 
interval of time.  Say, hypothetically (and definitely metaphorically), that a cue memory spreads 
100 units of electricity per second.  Also say hypothetically that MacDonald’s is only associated 
to 2 memories: burger and hash browns.  The reason thinking about MacDonald’s causes you to 
think of burgers first is that the memory of burgers receives, say, 80 of the 100 units of electricity 
spread each second.  That is, for a memory to have a stronger association to a cue memory just 
means that it receives a greater proportion of the electricity that the cue memory is 
dispersing.  Hence, the reason thinking about MacDonald’s reminds you of burgers before it 
reminds you of hash browns is that the memory bulb for the burger is receiving more of the 
electricity being spread and so gets brighter more quickly.  Yet association strength is only one 
factor in the remembering process.  For example, if you just ate hash browns 30 minutes ago, and 
so the trace strength of hash browns is already high, then the memory bulb for hash browns will 
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already be almost bright enough to read its memory contents, and so it will only have to receive 
very little electricity.  Hence, in this case, MacDonald’s might remind you of hash browns 
first.  In any event, now that we have a clearer grasp of the mental machinery underlying the 
remembering process, we are in a position to explain the major source of forgetting: interference. 
 
Section 9 (Minimum time = 55s) 
As we discuss interference, let us switch back to the scenario in which we are trying to 
learn chemistry.  Let us pretend that we have only studied the first 10 elements of chemistry.  A 
major cue you would use to remind yourself of these elements is obviously “chemistry.”  If each 
of the elements is equally associated to “chemistry,” then, when “chemistry” is being processed 
as a cue, it will dispense [100 units of electricity ÷ 10 elements =] 10 units of electricity to each 
of the element memories (per second).  Now, what happens if you move on from studying the 
first 10 elements and are now studying elements 11-20?  We will assume that each of the first 20 
elements is now equally well associated to the cue “chemistry.”  Thus, the “chemistry” cue will 
now only dispense [100 units of electricity ÷ 20 elements =] 5 units of electricity to each of the 
first 10 element memories (per second).  Hence, learning elements 11-20 caused the “chemistry” 
cue to spread less electricity to the memories of the first 10 elements, down from 10 units per 
second to 5 units per second.  Learning elements 11-20 has now made it harder to remember the 
first 10 elements.  This is how new learning can cause forgetting.  It’s like the memories 
associated to the cue are competing for electricity and are competing to be remembered.  As the 
number of competitors increases, the less likely a particular memory is to win the competition 
and be recalled. 
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Section 10 (Minimum time = 35s) 
Now, let us assume that, seeing that we have weakened our memories for those first 10 
chemistry elements, we decide to restudy those first 10 elements (but not elements 11-20).  This 
restudying will do 2 things.  First, it will strengthen the trace strengths of the first 10 elements, 
which by itself will make them more easily recallable on a quiz.  It also, though, will strengthen 
the association strengths between chemistry and each of the first 10 elements.  When we last 
finished studying the second set of elements, ‘chemistry’ was sending 5 units of electricity per 
second to each of the 20 elements.  Let us say that our further studying of the first 10 elements 
has so strengthened their associations to ‘chemistry’ that they now each receive 9 units per 
second whenever we think about chemistry.  As a direct consequence, each of the elements 11-
20 is now only receiving 1 unit per second, for the ‘chemistry’ cue can only disperse 100 units 
total per second.  Hence it might be that we are now unable to recall elements 11-20, or that we 
have forgotten them. 
 
Section 11 (Minimum time = 30s) 
What we have laid out are some basic principles of memory and forgetting.  Traditional 
theories of forgetting have assumed that forgetting is caused primarily by interference from 
competing memories, which are other memories associated to the cue being used.  Differences in 
trace strength are thought to be more important for determining how quickly a memory is 
recalled, rather than whether or not it is recalled.  One must keep in mind that we have explained 
these principles in simple scenarios (e.g., our memory of MacDonald’s being only associated to 
two other memories).  When we say that it is the learning of new information that causes 
forgetting of old information, we may seem to imply that it is impossible to have expert 
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knowledge of chemistry, or of different bird species.  But of course, there are those who have 
that expert knowledge.  We will just say that the associations and links connecting an expert’s 
memories are considerably more complex than the examples we have been going over. 
 
Experiment 1: Text 2 
Section 1 (Minimum time = 200s) 
The traditional account of forgetting (that we just covered) assumed that forgetting was 
caused primarily by the interference produced by competing memories. A more recent theory of 
forgetting has built on top of this work by adding a new forgetting process: memory inhibition 
(or memory suppression).  In so doing, this theory has radically altered conceptions about 
forgetting.  Before we dive more into the details, let us first consider the inspiration for this new 
theory. 
I have explained that, in traditional accounts of forgetting, the main reason that a cue 
becomes incapable of reminding us of a particular memory is that it has become more strongly 
associated to other competing memories.  According to the inhibition theorists, the problem that 
had been ignored is not why we forget things, but rather why we remember things as well as we 
do.  For example, whenever we think of fruit, most of us immediately think of apples, bananas, 
and grapes.  Yet, if we are asked about the fruit popular in Hawaii, we have no problem 
remembering the pineapple.  This is striking because our impulse to think of the other fruits 
(apples, bananas) is essentially a habit, and we all know how hard it is to break habits.  In the 
realm of bodily movement, habit-driven responses are over-ridden by inhibitory neurons.  For 
example, when we accidentally knock something off a counter, we reflexively and without 
thought try to catch it before it hits the ground.  But what if you knock over a cactus?  In that 
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case, the brain must send inhibitory messages to your arm in order to stop it from trying to catch 
the cactus.  Similarly, we might inhibit our habitual response to think of apples when trying to 
retrieve our pineapple memory.  Hence, whenever there is some specific memory that we are 
trying to retrieve, inhibitory mechanisms are thought to come into play and to further the success 
of that retrieval attempt. 
 
Section 3 (Minimum time = 55s) 
It is clear how inhibitory mechanisms might be involved in our memory machinery, but 
how do they work?  According to the theory, the inhibition holds down the trace strengths of 
competing memories to a low level.  By keeping the trace strengths of competing memories 
low—by keeping their bulbs dark—the inhibitory mechanism prevents the habit–driven retrieval 
of those memories.  You are thus more capable of retrieving the memory you are interested in 
because you are not being distracted by those competing memories.  Thinking about the 
competing memories as distractors is key to understanding the way inhibition works.  Just as 
you’re better able to process the information in a book if there is less distraction (e.g., party 
music, a spouse nagging you about chores, a strange odor seeping from a person nearby), so too 
are you better able to access the information contained in a memory trace of interest if competing 
memories are not springing into consciousness.  We all know the feeling when the inhibitory 
mechanism doesn’t work, such as when you are trying to remember a computer password you 
just recently made, but are unable to get the old password out of your head. 
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Section 3 (Minimum time = 50s) 
This new theory prompts the old question: why do we forget?  We are said to have this 
inhibitory mechanism that reduces the interference caused by competing memories, and yet it 
was just this interference that was traditionally blamed for our forgetfulness.  So, if the 
competing memories are no longer the major cause of forgetting, then what is?  But of course, it 
is the inhibition itself that is the main cause.  The reason you have forgotten an older password is 
that, when first learning a new password, you had to repeatedly inhibit that old password.  This 
reduction of the inhibited memory’s trace strength (dimming of the bulb) has made it hard for it 
to get enough electricity later when you want to retrieve it.  There is some speculation that 
inhibition might even make it difficult to charge the memory bulb of an inhibited memory.  This 
would make sense because low trace strength, by itself, has long been thought to not 
substantially cause forgetting.  In any event, it seems that inhibition not only facilitates the act of 
remembering desired information, but also impairs (later) acts of remembering other 
information. 
 
Section 4 (Minimum time = 70s) 
Considering that inhibition causes forgetting, one might wonder if inhibition is really that 
advantageous.   The inhibition theorists would argue that it is, and that it is outdated information 
(as old passwords normally are) that are most negatively affected by inhibition.  Inhibition can 
thus be thought of as decluttering the mind of old memory “files.”  Keep in mind though that 
“decluttering” is merely a metaphor, and that the inhibited memory traces are not thought to be 
removed in any sense; rather, inhibited memories merely have their trace strength kept low. 
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We have so far described the inhibition theory as it was first presented.  The theory has 
developed since then and has gotten more specific on a number of points.  First, not all 
competing memories are inhibited.  On the contrary, inhibition is only thought to be applied to 
strong competitors, to memories that are causing substantial distraction to your conscious 
attempt to remember some bit of information.   For example, when you are trying to remember a 
lesser known president (say, John Tyler), it would be beneficial if you could prevent Bush, 
Obama, and Trump from getting stuck in your head.  However, you probably do not have to 
worry about being distracted by your memory of Chester Arthur (the 21st president), and so there 
is no strong need to inhibit that memory.  You only inhibit a memory if doing so significantly 
aids your effort to remember some particular information of interest.  Inhibition that is more 
extensive might harm your general ability to remember useful information. 
 
Section 5 (Minimum time = 60s) 
Research on the inhibition theory has also produced results which suggest that a change 
was needed in the very conception of what a memory trace is.  What were those results?  It was 
found that a person’s memory of spear became less accessible as a result from thinking of a loud 
thing beginning with “si.”  The person had earlier in the experiment read that sirens are loud, and 
that was the word that they were supposed to recall.  Doing so made them less likely to think of 
spear when they were later asked to think of something sharp that begins with “sp.”  But why 
should spear be inhibited when you are trying to think of a particular loud thing?  Spears are not 
loud, and most people do not in any way associate them with loudness.  What the researchers 
concluded was that spear was not inhibited.  Instead, what were inhibited were other loud things 
that participants studied in the beginning of the experiment, namely, cannon, grenade, and 
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gun.  However, because spear shares characteristics with these inhibited memories—they are all 
weapons—spear too was affected by the inhibition.  This insight was what prompted the 
inhibition theorists to change their conception of what a memory trace is. 
 
Section 6 (Minimum time = 80s) 
A simple way of viewing memories is to think of them as being unitary, to think of each 
as being a single file completely independent of every other memory.  Indeed, this was the 
conception we explicitly used above.  The inhibition theorists began to claim that memories are 
in fact distributive.  There might be a single memory trace for each elementary idea, such as red, 
solid, spherical.  However, more complex memories, such as apple, are composites made up of 
those more elementary memory features.  Importantly, there is only one trace for each 
elementary feature.  There are not two different memory copies of the red trace, but rather a 
single trace that is shared by, say, your apple memory and your ketchup memory.  If you inhibit 
apple while thinking of another fruit (such as banana), then the red trace will be inhibited, for it 
was one of the traces making up the apple memory.  But because the red trace is part of the 
ketchup memory, that means that our ketchup memory will also be inhibited to some 
degree.  However, other elementary traces that are part of ketchup but are not shared with the 
apple memory, such as liquid, will remain uninhibited.  The ketchup trace will therefore only be 
partially inhibited.  It should also be noted that the features that apple shares with banana—the 
fruit that was remembered—will not be inhibited.  Otherwise, the inhibitory system would 
inhibit part of the very memory that the person is trying to retrieve!  Hence, elementary features 
such as sweetness, fruit, etc. will not be inhibited in the apple trace, and it will only be partially 
inhibited. 
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Section 7 (Minimum time = 80s) 
The final development in the new inhibition theory of forgetting was the recognition that 
inhibition mechanisms, like all mechanisms in the human body, do not function flawlessly.  In 
fact, as the demand for inhibition increases, the probability of successful inhibition 
decreases.  Very strong competitor memories can be thought of as sometimes being too strong to 
be subdued.  When inhibition fails, then one can in fact expect the non-inhibited memory in 
question to actually be more accessible than it was prior to the attempt to inhibit it.  Of course, 
that makes it seem that a subsequent attempt to inhibit that memory is even less likely to be 
successful, with another inhibition failure making that competitor even stronger, and thus it 
seems like we will never be able to inhibit this memory unless we wait a little while for its trace 
strength to naturally dissipate.  However, recent data suggests that those subsequent attempts to 
inhibit the memory also gain in forcefulness, and that eventually the attempts at inhibition will 
succeed and start to make that competitor memory less accessible. 
Such is the developing inhibition theory of forgetting.  It should be remembered that the 
theory basically assumes everything that the traditional interference theory of forgetting did, and 
then adds new mechanisms and ideas about how the memory machinery works.  However, this 
new theory is radically different from the old theory insofar as it suggests that interference is 
only a minor cause of our forgetting, and that the major cause is inhibition.  The older, more 
traditional theory of forgetting based solely on interference still has its defenders to this day, and 
the debate between the two camps does not seem to be ending any time soon. 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1: Text 1 Test 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 80s) 
George Willis is a philosophy professor at Tufts University.  When he was a graduate 
student, he studied the works of Franz Brentano and of his pupils, including Tomas Masaryk.  At 
the time, Willis found Tomas Masaryk to be an interesting character in world history, for 
Masaryk succeeded in gaining Czechoslovakian independence as a republic after World War I. 
Masaryk also both founded and was the first President of Czechoslovakia.  In any event, George 
Willis has not studied or thought about Tomas Masaryk since his graduate school days, but has 
rather studied the works of various other philosophers, mostly those centered in Latin 
America.  As a result, when George Willis is asked to name as many philosophers as he can, he 
always seems to forget Masaryk.  
Will this learning of other philosophers also cause George Willis to forget to name 
Masaryk when asked to name as many Czech politicians as he can? 
a.      Yes, for those other philosophers have been more thoroughly studied, have stronger 
associations, and so receive too much of the mental electricity being spread 
  
b.      Yes, for too much time has passed and so the trace strength of Masaryk will be too low 
  
c.      No, for the learning of new information does not decrease the trace strength of old 
information 
  
d.      No, for much of Willis’ subsequent learning is associated to his memories on 
philosophy, but not to his thought on Czechoslovakia 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 80s) 
Two students are studying for their second chemistry test.  The first chemistry test 
covered their memory for the first 20 elements; their current test will cover their memory for 
elements 21-40.  The first student has elements 21-40 written down on a sheet of paper and 
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studies by just rereading that sheet of paper.  The second student has made notecards, with one 
side asking a question (for example, “What is the 23rd element?”) and the other side providing 
the answer (Vanadium).  The second student tests himself using these notecards, not even 
looking at the right answer if he is confident that he has answered the question correctly.  Which 
of the following is correct? 
a.      The first student is likely to forget more of the first 20 elements than is the second student, 
for the first student is actually physically perceiving information about the second 20 elements, 
thereby strengthening their association to “Chemistry” for him 
  
b.      The second student is likely to forget more of the first 20 elements than is the second 
student, for the first student actually has to suppress those memories when trying to test himself 
over elements 21-40 
  
c.      Whenever a cue (such as “Chemistry Element” and “23”) leads to retrieval of 
information (Vanadium), that causes the association between the cue and that information 
to strengthen.  Hence, both students are likely to forget much of the first 20 elements as a 
consequent of studying elements 21-40. 
  
d.    The form of study will not matter.  What is important is that any study method for studying 
elements 21-40 means that the student is not studying the first 20 elements, and so their trace 
strengths consequently weaken. 
 
Question 3 (Minimum time: 70s) 
Aristotle reported that, as a teenager, he decided to tackle the Greek classic, Herodotus’ 
The Histories.  This book is massive, weighing in at 736 pages.  Aristotle thus decided to just 
read 10 pages a day, and so finished it within 2-3 months.  Now, in this book one comes across 
many characters (think of our own history books), some prominent and some minor.  Hence, one 
is likely to forget some characters from the middle of the book (covering the history of Scythia) 
as a consequence of reading about the characters from the remainder of the book (largely 
covering the Greaco-Persian wars).  Which of the following is correct? 
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a.      One’s memory for prominent characters from the middle of the book will in not be affected 
from reading about characters from the remainder of the book, for they are prominent and 
memorable characters 
 
b.      Characters from the middle of the book, both minor and prominent, will become less 
accessible because they will receive less of the mental electricity 
 
c.      One’s memory for the minor characters from the middle of the book will not be affected by 
interference from characters learned later because they were not that memorable to start with 
 
d.      Memory for the characters from the middle of the book will only become less accessible if 
you test yourself over the later characters. 
 
Question 4 (Minimum time: 65s) 
Two students are studying the various species of snakes for an upcoming exam.  The test 
requires the students to give the names of 50 different snakes and to give their average 
lengths.  One student studies an alphabetical list of these 50 snakes and their lengths.  The other 
student divides the snakes into 5 groups, with each group representing the continent of 
origin.  Hence, this student not only studies these snakes’ names and lengths, but also whether 
they came from North America, South America, Africa, Europe, or Asia.  Which of the 
following is correct? 
a.      The first student will perform better on the test because he is not wasting his time studying 
continents of origin 
  
b.      The second student will perform better because he can use the continents of origin as 
cues 
  
c.      The first student will perform better on the test because he is learning the snakes in a 
specific order 
  
d.      The second student will perform better because he is trying to encode more detailed 
memory traces 
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Question 5 (Minimum time: 65s) 
A student of East-Asian religions has decided to learn Sanskrit so that he can read many 
of their sacred scriptures in their original language.  He studies 10 Sanskrit words on one day and 
another 10 Sanskrit words the next day.  On the third day, he tries to recall all 20 Sanskrit 
words.  Which of the following is correct? 
a.      The cue “Sanskrit words” will send equal amounts of activation to words from the 
first day and to words from the second day 
  
b.      The cue “Sanskrit words” will send greater amounts of activation to words from the second 
day than to words from the first day 
  
c.      The cue “Sanskrit words” did not change in its association strength to the first set of words 
after the second set of words were studied; it is just that further associations were added to that 
cue 
  
d.     The words from the first day have been studied just as much as the words from the second, 
so there will be no difference in trace strength between those two groups of words 
 
 
Experiment 1: Text 2 Test 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 55s) 
In a game of trivia, a person tries to remember the two actors starring in “The 
Gladiator.”  After correctly recalling Russell Crowe, the person is unable to remember Joaquin 
Phoenix.  The person thus starts trying to think of other movies that Phoenix had been in, hoping 
that will help to jog his memory.  Will the fact that the person just remembered Russell Crowe 
impair the ability of the other cues—these other movies that Phoenix starred in—to remind the 
person of Phoenix’s name? 
a.      No, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
b.      No, according to the inhibition theory, but yes, according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
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c.      Yes, according to the inhibition theory, but no, according to the traditional 
interference theory of forgetting 
  
d.      Yes, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 65s) 
Timmy, an 8-year old boy has just seen the movie 101 Dalmatians for the first time, and 
loved it.  He is now trying to memorize the names of all 101 Dalmatians, and has so far practiced 
encoding the first 20.  Timmy’s father, a memory researcher, is wondering what would happen if 
he made a computer program to help Timmy study.  The program shows Timmy the names of 10 
of the Dalmatians, showing one at a time for 5 seconds.  Will this extra studying negatively 
affect Timmy’s memory for the 10 Dalmatians not presented on the program, but which Timmy 
had already studied earlier? 
a.       No, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
b.      No, according to the inhibition theory, but yes, according to the traditional 
interference theory of forgetting 
  
c.       Yes, according to the inhibition theory, but no, according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
d.      Yes, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
 
 
Question 3 (Minimum time: 120s) 
A memory researcher ran an experiment.  In this experiment, participants were presented 
with 36 category-example pairs (e.g., INSECT-beetle).  Six different categories (e.g., WEAPON, 
TOOL, INSECT would be 3 of these 6 categories) were each presented 6 times, and were paired 
with a different example each of those 6 times (e.g., beetle, hornet, mosquito could be 3 of the 6 
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examples paired with INSECT, whereas, wrench, hammer, and nails could be 3 of the 6 
examples paired with TOOL).  Participants were given 5 seconds to study each of these 36 
category-example pairs.   
Importantly, half of the participants only studied examples that were weakly associated 
with the categories (e.g., INSECT-locust, INSECT-cicada, INSECT-tick) and half of the 
participants only  studied examples that were strongly associated with the categories (e.g., 
INSECT-beetle, INSECT-hornet, INSECT-mosquito).   
  Next, participants were tested on half of the examples of each category.  On each trial, 
the category and first letter of the appropriate example were presented as cues (e.g., “INSECT-
c___?”).  No corrective feedback was given.  The test results did suggest that the researcher did a 
good job of choosing his examples: Those who studied the strong examples correctly responded 
to 95% of the test questions, whereas those who studied the weak examples only responded 
correctly to 60% of their test questions. 
  Finally, the researcher tested the participants over the other half of the examples of each 
category, again providing the category and the first letter of the appropriate examples on each of 
the test questions (e.g., INSECT—l__?).  An interesting question is whether the participants’ 
ability to recall these examples was impaired as a result of recalling the other examples on the 
first test.  More specifically, did the participants who studied the strong examples receive a 
greater degree of such impairment than did the participants who studied the weak examples? 
a.      No, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
b.      No according to the inhibition theory, but yes according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
c.       Yes according to the inhibition theory, but no according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
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d.      Yes, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional 
interference theory of forgetting 
 
 
Trick Question (Minimum time: 25s) 
In a remote association task (RAT), participants are presented with 3 cues (e.g., 
“manners”-“tennis”-“round”) and are asked to come up with a word that is associated to all 3 of 
the cues (e.g., “table”).  This task is made more difficult when, prior to seeing the 3 cues, 
participants are exposed to distraction-words that are each associated with some but not all of the 
cues (e.g., “polite,” “racket,” “circle”).  Pick the third answer.  According to the inhibitory 
account, should people who exhibit substantial retrieval-induced forgetting be more negatively 
affected by the distraction words (than people who exhibit less substantial retrieval-induced 
forgetting), less negatively affected, or equally affected?  
a)      More negatively affected 
 
b)     Less negatively affected 
 
c)      Equally negatively affected 
 
d)     Cannot Tell 
 
 
Question 4 (Minimum time: 85s) 
Participants are asked to learn a number of “facts” about certain fictional characters.  For 
example, they could study the following facts about the “salesman”: the salesman sells apples; 
the salesman sells cigarettes; the salesman sells staplers; etc.  They could also learn facts about 
the librarian: the librarian likes dressers; the librarian likes trees; the librarian likes skateboards; 
etc. 
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In the researchers’ first experiment, participants learned 6 facts about each of 8 
characters, and then took a test over half of the facts of each character (e.g., the salesman sells 
ci___?).  However, because these materials do not have natural associations (as contrasted with, 
for example, the association everyone has between Fruit and Apple), the researchers were 
worried that the participants couldn’t learn the material well.  Hence, the researchers thought that 
it would be a good idea to run a second experiment at the same time, which was identical except 
participants only had to learn facts about 4 characters instead of 8 characters (they did increase 
the number of facts learned about each character to 10 in order somewhat maintain the total 
number of facts that had to be learned).  Again, the participants took a test over half the facts of 
each character.  According to the inhibition theory, what should we predict?  
a.      The untested facts will be inhibited to a greater degree in Experiment 1 than in 
Experiment 2. 
  
b.      The untested facts will be inhibited to a greater degree in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 
1. 
  
c.      The untested facts will be inhibited to the same degree in both experiments 
  
d.      The principles of the inhibition theory do not make any predictions on this issue 
 
 
Question 5 (Minimum time: 160s) 
 
A memory researcher ran an experiment.  In this experiment, participants were presented 
with 36 category-example pairs (e.g., COTTON-curtains), which the participants tried to 
memorize for a later test.  Eight different categories (e.g., COTTON, LEATHER, LOUD, 
SHARP were 4 of these 8 categories) were each presented 6 times, and were paired with a 
different example each of those 6 times (e.g., curtains, pajamas, and robe were 3 of the 6 
examples paired with COTTON, whereas, briefcase, saddle, and belt were 3 of the 6 examples 
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paired with LEATHER; see the table below for 4 of the categories).  Participants were given 5 
seconds to study each of these 36 category-example pairs.  
 
Importantly, 3 examples from each category happened to share a category with 3 
examples from another category.  For example, pajamas (a COTTON example) and belt (a 
LEATHER example) both belong to the shared category of CLOTHING.  These shared 
categories (e.g., CLOTHING, WEAPON) were never explicitly mentioned to the participants in 
the experiment.  
  The reason why the researcher used examples that shared these categories was that the 
researcher was interested in testing predictions of the traditional interference theory of 
forgetting.  In particular, he wanted to test predictions that this theory makes when memories are 
assumed to have distributed representations as opposed to unitary representations. 
  After studying the category-example pairs, participants took a practice test over half of 
the examples of half the categories (e.g., ‘COTTON-pa___?’).  The figure above notes which 
examples were assessed during the practice test (PT; e.g., pajamas, cannon) and which were not 
(e.g., curtains, belt). 
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After the practice test, the participants took a final test over the other examples.  In order to 
increase the difficulty of the test, cues different from the original categories were used (e.g., 
“HANGS-c___?” for curtains and “LOOP-b___?” for belt).  How is performance on this test 
going to be affected from having worked through the practice test, according to the two 
prominent theories of forgetting?  Remember that we are assuming that memories have a 
distributed representation rather than a unitary representation. 
a.      The inhibition theory: belt has become more recallable than prior; 
the traditional interference theory: curtains has become more recallable than prior 
  
b.      The inhibition theory: curtains has become more recallable than prior; 
the traditional interference theory: belt has become less recallable than prior 
  
c.      The inhibition theory: curtains has become less recallable than prior; 
the traditional interference theory: belt has become more recallable than prior 
  
d.      The inhibition theory: belt has become less recallable than prior; 
the traditional interference theory: curtains has become less recallable than prior 
 
 
 
  
80 
 
Appendix C 
Experiments 2-4: Text 1  
Section 1 (Minimum time = 10s) 
We all are familiar with the act of remembering.  In fact, most of us are annoyed by the 
limits of memory.  However, scientists are discovering that forgetting might be adaptive.  These 
scientists are of course also learning that our memory system is more complicated than you 
would think.  This article will cover some of the insights made by these scientists. 
 
Section 2 (Minimum time = 10s) 
Memory scientists take certain things for granted.  For example, it is assumed that you 
can only remember something if you were reminded of it by some other thing.  When you 
remember that you have been meaning to call your mother, you do not just remember this out of 
the blue.  Rather, you were thinking about something else which reminded you to call your 
mother.  Seeing a can of Red Bull might remind you to call your mother if she drinks 5 Red 
Bulls every day.  The thing that reminds you of something else is called a cue. 
 
Section 3 (Minimum time = 20s) 
It should be noted that a cue must already have a link to the memory it reminds you 
of.  Thinking about monks is unlikely to make you think about the “macarena dance.”  (This 
assumes that you have not seen monks doing the macarena.  And the “macarena” is not to be 
confused with the “monkarena,” which monks do perform).  Most of us have not made a mental 
connection (or link) between monks and the macarena.  However, thinking about the cookies 
you’re eating can clearly remind you of milk.  Similarly, thinking about mice might cause you to 
think about cats.  And mugs make us think more of beer or coffee than of tea or lemonade. 
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Now, if I ask you what comes to mind when you hear the word fire, there are many 
answers you could give.  The word fire could remind you of camping.  It could also remind you 
of Cheetos (the “flaming” hot ones).  Or you might think of Hell.  But, we can only remember 
one thing at a time.  So what will you be reminded of first whenever you think about fire? 
 
Section 4 (Minimum time = 30s) 
Scientists have traditionally assumed that 2 factors determine which memory a cue 
reminds you of first.  These are link strength and trace strength.  “Trace” is here being used in 
the sense of a “memory trace.”  A memory trace is a record in one’s mind for a particular 
memory.  For example, we say that we store information about muzzles in one memory trace—
the muzzle memory trace.  Information about muggles is stored in a different memory trace—the 
muggle trace. 
The concepts of link strength and trace strength can be illustrated by thinking about 
MacDonald's and IHOP.  Both of these restaurants serve burgers as well as eggs.  Importantly, 
most of us know (or can remember) this information about these two restaurants.  Thus, our 
memory of each restaurant is linked to both our burger memories and to our egg memories.  
Nevertheless, thinking about IHOP is more likely to remind us of eggs than of burgers. 
MacDonald’s, however, is more likely to remind us of burgers than of eggs. Clearly, the link 
between IHOP and eggs has more link strength than does the link between IHOP and 
burgers.  It is the opposite, though, with MacDonald's. 
Put simply, IHOP has a stronger association to eggs than to burgers.  MacDonald's has a 
stronger association to burgers than to eggs.  We will flesh out the mechanism underlying link 
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strength later on.   But first: Why might MacDonald's sometimes makes us think of eggs more 
quickly than burgers? 
 
Section 5 (Minimum time = 20s) 
The reason why MacDonald's might remind us of its eggs first is that the eggs memory 
trace might have high trace strength.  For example, perhaps you just got up and are hungry for 
breakfast.  Then your mother asks you if you want something from MacDonald's.  You 
immediately think of the fact that they serve eggs.  (And then you yell at your mother to go get 
eggs).  The reason, as mentioned, is that your prior thinking caused your eggs memory to have 
high trace strength.  We will now see what that means. 
Imagine that each of your memories has a light bulb hanging over it.  Furthermore, there 
is no way to turn the bulb off.  They are continuously turned on.  If a given bulb is bright enough, 
then you can “read” the contents of its memory.  However, with time, the bulb’s battery will get 
used up.  That is, the bulb (or memory) will lose its trace strength.  The bulb will therefore get 
dimmer, making it harder to read the contents of its memory.  This is partially why we barely 
remember, say, what we learned in our chemistry class.  It seems like we would not forget out 
chemistry if we never stopped studying it.  It seems like the light bulbs would not then get 
dimmer.  This suggests that there are ways to recharge these bulbs.  Indeed, there at least 2 ways 
to recharge a memory’s trace strength. 
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Section 6 (Minimum time = 10s) 
First, whenever we process a memory, we recharge its trace strength.  Each time you 
restudy Helium, you recharge its bulb.  (Similarly, you recharge your car battery whenever you 
run the engine).  This incoming “mental electricity” can only recharge the bulb to a certain point: 
until it is fully charged.  This happens rather quickly.  After that, the mental electricity spreads 
down the links connected to that memory.  In this way, other memories linked to the Helium 
memory are also recharged.  This is the second way in which trace strength is recharged. 
 
Section 7 (Minimum time = 10s) 
As mentioned, you can only recall a memory if it has high trace strength.  Only then can 
you read the contents of the memory.  Memories with dimmer bulbs take longer to 
recharge.  Thus, to recall these memories, you must process a linked cue memory for a longer 
time.  And so, consider again whether fire reminds me first of Cheetos or of camping.  Assume 
that I ate ten bags of Cheetos yesterday.  Fire is thus likely to remind me of Cheetos first.  This is 
how trace strength influences the memory-retrieval process.  We will now explore how link 
strength also influences this process.  In fact, we will see why link strength and NOT trace 
strength is the main cause of forgetting. 
 
Section 8 (Minimum time = 11s) 
Whenever you charge a cue memory, there is a limited amount of electricity it can send 
to linked memories.  Say the cue memory spreads 100 units of mental electricity per 
second.  We said that IHOP (cue) has greater link strength to eggs than to burgers.  What this 
means is that this cue sends more electricity per second to eggs than to burgers.  It might send 70 
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units per second to one and 30 units per second to the other.  Hence, the eggs bulb (trace 
strength) will get brighter more quickly.  We are now in a position to understand why we 
forget.   
 
Section 9 (Minimum time = 20s) 
The basic idea is that forgetting is caused by new learning.  ‘Learning’ means the adding 
or strengthening of other links to some cue.  Say we are learning chemistry for the first 
time.  Our teacher initially has us learn the first 10 elements.  A major cue you would use to 
remind yourself of these elements would be ‘chemistry.’  Assume that, after studying, all 
elements have the same link strength to ‘chemistry.’  Also recall that a cue can only spread a 
limited amount of electricity: 100 units per second.  Thus, ‘chemistry’ would spread [100 ÷ 10 
elements =] 10 units per second to each of the elements.  Each has a link strength of 10 units per 
second.  You then study elements 11-20.  Eventually, all of the first 20 elements have the same 
link strength to ‘chemistry.’  Specifically, each has a link strength of [100 ÷ 20 elements =] 5 
units per second to each of the elements.  Thus, the link strength of the first 10 elements has 
gotten worse.  The reason is that you linked 10 new elements to the cue. 
 
Section 10 (Minimum time = 30s) 
Something similar happens if you then only study elements 11-20 even more.  This 
additional study will increase their link strength.  Assume these elements now receive 9 units 
per second.  That would mean that each of the first 10 elements now only receive 1 unit per 
second.  Their link strength has again gotten worse, and again because of further memorizing of 
other information.  
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We can think of the memories linked to a cue as competing for electricity.  More 
importantly, we can think of them as competing to be remembered.  Memories with stronger 
links tend to be recalled more quickly.  In our example, the student would tend to think elements 
11-20 more quickly than elements 1-10.  But if this is the case, then it will be hard to think of 
elements 1-10 at all.  The reason is that you would first have to get elements 11-20 out of your 
head.  Think about how hard it can be to remember a song when you have another song already 
stuck in your head.  Furthermore, it is hard to get elements 11-20 out of your head if the cue you 
are using (‘chemistry’) keeps reminding you of them.  Thus, you can be incapable of retrieving a 
memory if other memories are “getting in the way.”  Scientists think of these competing 
memories as causing interference.  Hence, this theory of forgetting is called the interference 
theory. 
 
Experiments 2-4: Text 2 
Section 1 (Minimum time = 10s) 
The traditional account of forgetting (that we just covered) assumed that forgetting is 
caused by interference from competing memories. A more recent theory of forgetting has built 
on top of this work.  What it adds is a new forgetting process: memory inhibition (or memory 
suppression).  In so doing, this theory has radically altered conceptions about forgetting.  Let us 
begin by considering the inspiration for this new theory.  
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Section 2 (Minimum time = 20s) 
In the interference theory of forgetting, a cue becomes incapable of reminding us of a 
particular memory when it becomes more strongly linked to other competing memories.  This 
theory only explains why we forget.  But why do we remember things as well as we do? 
For example, U.S. citizens think of “cities,” they normally think of U. S. cities.  They 
may also think of a few foreign cities, such as Paris or London.  However, the Egyptian city 
Cairo is not likely to come to mind.  It is not likely to come to mind even when they think about 
Egypt.  Rather, they will usually think of deserts, pyramids, Moses, and mummies.  It is not our 
mental tendency (or our habit) to recall Cairo when thinking about Egypt or cities.  Our tendency 
or habit is to recall those other memories.  Yet, if we are asked to name Egyptian cities, most 
people, effortlessly, recall Cairo.  This is striking because normally it is hard to break habits. 
 
Section 3 (Minimum time = 10s) 
In the realm of bodily movement, habit-driven responses are over-ridden by inhibitory 
neurons.  For example, when we accidentally knock something off a counter, we reflexively try 
to catch it.  But what if you knock over a cactus?  Then, the brain must send inhibitory messages 
to your arm in order to stop it from trying to catch the cactus.   Similarly, we might inhibit our 
habitual response to think of Moses or Paris when trying to retrieve our Cairo memory.  Hence, 
inhibition can aid our attempt to recall a given memory. 
It is clear how inhibition might be involved, but how does it work?  
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Section 4 (Minimum time = 20s) 
According to the theory, inhibition holds down the trace strengths of competing 
memories to a low level.  Inhibition thereby prevents the habitual retrieval of those 
memories.  You are thus more capable of retrieving the memory you are interested in. 
Thinking about the competing memories as distractors is key.  You’re better able to 
process the content in a book if there is less distraction. So too are you better able to read the 
content in a memory if competing memories are not springing to mind.  
We all know the feeling when the inhibition doesn’t work.  Think about trying to 
remember a computer password when you can’t get the old password out of your head. 
 
Section 5 (Minimum time = 30s) 
This new theory prompts the old question. Why do we forget?  Inhibition reduces the 
interference caused by competing memories.  Yet, it was interference that was thought to cause 
forgetting.  If competing memories are not a major cause of forgetting, then what is? 
But of course, it is inhibition itself that is the main cause.  Let us say you have 
successfully remembered a new computer password.  Well, you inhibit the old password each 
time you remember the new one.  The reduction in the that memory’s trace strength has made it 
hard for it to get enough electricity later when/if you want to retrieve it.   
It is also believed that inhibition makes it difficult for the memory bulb to even be charged by 
incoming mental electricity.  That is, it is hard for its trace strength to even be increased.  This 
makes sense because low trace strength, by itself, has been thought to not truly cause 
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forgetting.  In any event, inhibition does not only help us remember (right now).  It also impairs 
(later) acts of remembering. 
 
Section 6 (Minimum time = 10s) 
Considering that inhibition causes forgetting, is it really that advantageous?   The 
inhibition theorists argue that it is.  They claim that that it is outdated information (as old 
passwords are) that is most negatively affected.  Inhibition can thus be thought of as decluttering 
the mind of old memory “files.”  Keep in mind though that “decluttering” is merely a 
metaphor.  Don’t think of inhibited memory traces as being “removed.”  Rather, inhibited 
memories merely have their trace strength kept low. 
 
Section 7 (Minimum time = 20s) 
We have so far described the inhibition theory as it was first presented.  The theory has 
been further developed since then.  
First, not all competing memories are inhibited.  Only memories causing substantial 
interference are inhibited.   
For example, say you are trying to remember a lesser known president (say, John 
Tyler).  It would be nice if you could prevent Bush, Obama, and Trump from getting stuck in 
your head.  However, your memory of Chester Arthur (the 21st president) won’t be very 
distracting.  You therefore will not inhibit that memory.  
You ONLY inhibit a memory IF doing so significantly aids your effort to recall a 
particular memory.  Inhibition that is more extensive might harm your general ability to 
remember useful information. 
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Section 8 (Minimum time = 30s) 
Research on the inhibition theory has also produced results which suggest that a change 
was needed in the very conception of what a memory trace is.  What were those results?  
It was found that a person’s memory of spear became less accessible as a result from 
thinking of a loud thing beginning with “si.”  The person had earlier in the experiment read that 
sirens are loud, and that was the word that they were supposed to recall.  Doing so made them 
less likely to think of spear when they were later asked to think of something sharp that begins 
with “sp.”  
But why should spear be inhibited when you are trying to think of a particular loud 
thing?  Spears are not loud, and most people do not in any way associate them with 
loudness.  What the researchers concluded was that spear was not inhibited.  
 Instead, what were inhibited were other loud things that participants studied in the 
beginning of the experiment, namely, cannon, grenade, and gun.  However, because spear shares 
characteristics with these inhibited memories—they are all weapons—spear too was affected by 
the inhibition.  This insight was what prompted the inhibition theorists to change their 
conception of what a memory trace is. 
Recent data have also suggested that we change our conception of what a memory trace 
is.  What were those data? 
 
Section 9 (Minimum time = 30s) 
It was found that a person’s memory of spear became less accessible in an odd 
scenario.  Specifically, the person recalled a “loud thing” beginning with “si.”  The person had 
earlier in the experiment read that sirens are loud, and that was the word he was supposed to 
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recall.  Doing so made him less likely to think of spear when later asked to think of something 
sharp that begins with “sp.” 
But why should spear be inhibited when you are trying to think of a particular “loud 
thing?”  Spears are not loud.  Most people do not in any way link them with loudness.  What the 
researchers concluded was that spear was not inhibited.  
Instead, what were inhibited were other loud things that participants studied.  In 
particular, participants inhibited cannon, grenade, and gun.  However, spear shares 
characteristics with these inhibited memories.  They are all weapons.  Because spear was similar 
to these other inhibited memories, it was negatively affected.  This insight was what prompted 
the inhibition theorists to change their conception of what a memory trace is. 
 
Section 10 (Minimum time = 20s) 
A simple way of viewing memories is to think of them as being unitary.  Each memory 
is thus a single file completely independent of every other memory.  This was the conception I 
have been using.  By contrast, memories can also be viewed as distributive.  
In a distributive theory of memory, there might be a single memory trace for each 
elementary idea, such as red, solid, spherical.  More complex memories, such as apple, are made 
up of elementary memory traces.  That is, a complex memory is not a single trace, but a group of 
traces.  Importantly, there is only one trace for each elementary idea.  Consider your apple 
memory and your ketchup memory.  Both contain the red trace.  However, they do not each have 
their own unique red trace.  Then you would have at least 2 different red traces.  But we just said 
that each person only has one red trace.  Hence, there must be a single red trace that is part of 
both memories. 
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Section 11 (Minimum time = 20s) 
If you inhibit apple while recalling another fruit (e.g., banana), then the red trace will be 
inhibited.  Inhibition of a complex memory is the inhibition of (most of) the elementary traces 
making it up.  (We will discuss why some of the elementary traces are not inhibited).  But the 
red trace is also part of the ketchup memory.  Thus, our ketchup memory will also be inhibited to 
some degree.  However, other elementary traces that are part of ketchup but are not shared with 
the apple memory (e.g., liquid) will remain uninhibited.  The ketchup trace will thus be partially 
inhibited.  
It should be noted that the features that apple shares with banana will not be 
inhibited.  Otherwise, one would inhibit part of the very memory one is trying to 
retrieve!  Hence, elementary features such as sweetness, solid, etc. will not be inhibited in the 
apple trace.  It will only be partially inhibited. 
 
Section 12 (Minimum time = 30s) 
The final development in the theory was that inhibition is not flawless.  Memories 
causing stronger interference are harder to inhibit.  Strong competitors can sometimes be too 
strong to be subdued.  When inhibition fails, the strong competitor will cause more interference 
than it did prior to the inhibition attempt. 
But would that not make a subsequent attempt to inhibit that memory even harder?  And 
if that attempt fails, then that competitor will be even stronger.  It thus seems like we might never 
be able to inhibit this memory.  However, recent data suggests that successive attempts to inhibit 
a memory gain in forcefulness.  Eventually, the attempts at inhibition will succeed. 
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Such is the developing inhibition theory of forgetting.  It should be remembered that the 
theory basically assumes everything that the traditional interference theory of forgetting did, and 
then adds new mechanisms and ideas about how the memory machinery works.  However, this 
new theory is radically different from the old theory insofar as it suggests that interference is 
only a minor cause of our forgetting, and that the major cause is inhibition.  The older, more 
traditional theory of forgetting based solely on interference still has its defenders to this day, and 
the debate between the two camps does not seem to be ending any time soon. 
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Appendix D 
Experiments 2-4: Text 1 Argument Inference Test 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 30s) 
George Willis is a philosophy professor at Tufts University.  When he was a graduate 
student, he studied the works of Franz Brentano and of his pupils, including Tomas Masaryk.  At 
the time, Willis found Tomas Masaryk to be an interesting character in world history, for 
Masaryk succeeded in gaining Czechoslovakian independence as a republic after World War I. 
Masaryk also both founded and was the first President of Czechoslovakia.  In any event, George 
Willis has not studied or thought about Tomas Masaryk since his graduate school days, but has 
rather studied the works of various other philosophers, mostly those centered in Latin 
America.  As a result, when George Willis is asked to name as many philosophers as he can, he 
always seems to forget Masaryk.  
Will this learning of other philosophers also cause George Willis to forget to name 
Masaryk when asked to name as many Czech politicians as he can? 
  
a.      Yes, for those Latin American philosophers have been more thoroughly studied, and so 
have stronger associations to the cue (Czech politicians), and so receive too much of the mental 
electricity being spread 
  
b.      No, for the learning of new information does not decrease the trace strength of old 
information 
  
c.      No, for much of Willis’ subsequent learning is associated to his memories on 
philosophy, but not to his thought on Czechoslovakia 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Aristotle reported that, as a teenager, he decided to tackle the Greek classic, Herodotus’ 
The Histories.  This book is massive, weighing in at 736 pages.  Aristotle thus decided to just 
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read 10 pages a day, and so finished it within 2-3 months.  Now, in this book one comes across 
many characters (think of our own history books), some prominent and some minor.  Hence, one 
is likely to forget some characters from the middle of the book (covering the history of Scythia) 
as a consequence of reading about the characters from the remainder of the book (largely 
covering the Greaco-Persian wars).  Which of the following is correct? 
a.      One’s memory for prominent characters from the middle of the book will in not be affected 
from reading about characters from the remainder of the book, for they are prominent and 
memorable characters 
 
b.      Characters from the middle of the book, both minor and prominent, will become less 
accessible because they will receive less of the mental electricity when trying to remember 
characters from the book 
 
c.      One’s memory for the minor characters from the middle of the book will not be affected by 
interference from characters learned later because they were not that memorable to start with 
 
Question 3 (Minimum time: 25s) 
Two students are studying the various species of snakes for an upcoming exam.  The test 
requires the students to give the names of 50 different snakes and to give their average 
lengths.  One student studies an alphabetical list of these 50 snakes and their lengths.  The other 
student divides the snakes into 5 groups, with each group representing the continent of 
origin.  Hence, this student not only studies these snakes’ names and lengths, but also whether 
they came from North America, South America, Africa, Europe, or Asia.  Which of the 
following is correct? 
a.      The first student will perform better on the test because he is not wasting his time studying 
continents of origin 
 
b.      The second student will perform better because he can use the continents of origin as 
cues 
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c.      The first student will perform better on the test because he is learning the snakes in a 
specific order 
 
Question 4 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Two students are studying for their second chemistry test.  The first chemistry test 
covered their memory for the first 20 elements; their current test will cover their memory for 
elements 21-40.  The first student has elements 21-40 written down on a sheet of paper and 
studies by just rereading that sheet of paper.  The second student has made notecards, with one 
side asking a question (for example, “What is the 23rd element?”) and the other side providing 
the answer (Vanadium).  The second student tests himself using these notecards, not even 
looking at the right answer if he is confident that he has answered the question correctly.  Which 
of the following is correct? 
a.      The first student is likely to forget more of the first 20 elements than is the second student, 
for the first student is actually physically perceiving information about the second 20 elements, 
thereby strengthening their association to “Chemistry” for him 
 
b.      The second student is likely to forget more of the first 20 elements than is the second 
student, for the first student actually has to suppress those memories when trying to test himself 
over elements 21-40 
 
c.      Whenever a cue (such as “Chemistry Element” and “23”) leads to retrieval of 
information (Vanadium), that causes the association between the cue and that information 
to strengthen.  Hence, both students are likely to forget much of the first 20 elements as a 
consequent of studying elements 21-40. 
 
Question 5 (Minimum time: 30s) 
A student of East-Asian religions has decided to learn Sanskrit so that he can read many 
of their sacred scriptures in their original language.  He studied 10 Sanskrit words on one day 
and another 10 Sanskrit words the next day.  On the third day, he tries to recall all 20 Sanskrit 
words.  Which of the following is correct? 
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a. The second set of 10 words will not be as easily remembered as they otherwise would be 
had the first set of 10 words not also been learned, for the first set is using up some of the 
mental electricity 
 
b. The second set of 10 words will be more easily remembered than they otherwise would be due 
to the fact that another set of 10 words was learned first, for this earlier learning gave the student 
practice with the language 
 
c. The ability to remember the second set of 10 words will in no way be affected by the earlier 
learning of the first set of words; for the learning of those words to cause interference, those 
words would had to have been learned after the second set of words was studied. 
 
Experiment 3: Text 1 Memory Test 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Which of the following illustrates trace strength? 
  
a.      You are likely, when asked about your friend, to of the time when he had a job as a 
birthday party clown because that is a very odd job to take 
  
b.      You are likely to think of your mother when seeing a can of red bull because you know that 
your mother drinks a lot of red bull 
  
c.      You are likely to think of Cheetos when asked to name some foods because you 
recently ate a bunch of Cheetos 
 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Which of the following illustrates link strength? 
a.      When asked to list as many governors as you can, you are likely to think of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger if you just watched one of his movies 
 
b.       When visiting a catholic school, you wonder if they have nuns there who hit students' 
knuckles with rulers, because that is how you have seen catholic schools portrayed on TV 
 
c.      If you saw a movie with a really bizarre scene, you are likely to think of that scene when 
asked about the movie 
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Question 3 (Minimum time: 25s) 
What is the main reason, according to the article, that we forget?? 
a.      The trace strength of our memories continuously decrease unless we retrieve them from 
time to time 
 
b.      We strengthen links to competing memories and add new links to new competing 
memories 
 
c.      We repress the memories of things that we do not want to remember 
 
Question 4 (Minimum time: 30s) 
How does the trace strength of a memory get increased? 
a.      We focus out attention on the content of the memory 
 
b.      We focus our attention on a different memory that is connected to it by a link 
 
c.      Both of the above 
 
Question 5 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Say you study the first 10 elements of chemistry (i.e., elements 1-10) for an hour  
 
total.  Three days later, you study the next 10 elements (i.e., elements 11-20), also for an hour  
 
total.  Which of the following is most likely to be the case immediately after studying elements  
 
11-20 for an hour? 
 
a. The link strengths of the first 10 elements are equal to the link strength of the other 10 
elements 
 
b. The link strengths of the first 10 elements are greater than the link strength of the other 10 
elements 
 
c. The link strengths of the first 10 elements are weaker than the link strength of the other 10 
elements 
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Experiment 4: Text 1 Non-Argument Inference Test 
Note: The bolded content is the feedback given to the Ps after answering a question 
 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 30s) 
George Willis is a philosophy professor at Tufts University.  When he was a graduate 
student, he studied the works of Franz Brentano and of his pupils, including Tomas Masaryk.  At 
the time, Willis found Tomas Masaryk to be an interesting character in world history, for 
Masaryk succeeded in gaining Czechoslovakian independence as a republic after World War I. 
Masaryk also both founded and was the first President of Czechoslovakia.  In any event, George 
Willis has not studied or thought about Tomas Masaryk since his graduate school days, but has 
rather studied the works of various other philosophers, mostly those centered in Latin 
America.  As a result, when George Willis is asked to name as many philosophers as he can, he 
always seems to forget Masaryk.  
Will this learning of other philosophers also cause George Willis to forget to name 
Masaryk when asked to name as many Czech politicians as he can? 
a. Yes, that will make it harder to remember Masaryk 
  
b. No, that will make it easier to remember Masaryk 
  
c. No, that will have no impact on his memory of Masaryk, for much of Willis’ subsequent 
learning is associated to his memories on philosophy, but not to his thought on 
Czechoslovakia 
 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Aristotle reported that, as a teenager, he decided to tackle the Greek classic, Herodotus’ 
The Histories.  This book is massive, weighing in at 736 pages.  Aristotle thus decided to just 
read 10 pages a day, and so finished it within 2-3 months.  Now, in this book one comes across 
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many characters (think of our own history books), some prominent and some minor.  Hence, one 
is likely to forget some characters from the middle of the book (covering the history of Scythia) 
as a consequence of reading about the characters from the remainder of the book (largely 
covering the Greaco-Persian wars).  Which of the following is correct? 
a.      One’s memory for prominent characters from the middle of the book will in not be affected 
from reading about characters from the remainder of the book 
  
b.      Characters from the middle of the book, both minor and prominent, will become less 
accessible, because they will receive less of the mental electricity when trying to remember 
characters from the book  
  
c.      One’s memory for the minor characters from the middle of the book will not be affected by 
interference from characters learned later 
 
Question 3 (Minimum time: 25s) 
Two students are studying the various species of snakes for an upcoming exam.  The test 
requires the students to give the names of 50 different snakes and to give their average 
lengths.  One student studies an alphabetical list of these 50 snakes and their lengths.  The other 
student divides the snakes into 5 groups, with each group representing the continent of 
origin.  Hence, this student not only studies these snakes’ names and lengths, but also whether 
they came from North America, South America, Africa, Europe, or Asia.  Which of the 
following is correct? 
a.      The first student will perform better on the test 
  
b.      The second student will perform better because he can use the continents of origin as 
cues 
  
c.      Thee will be no difference between the performances of the two students 
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Question 4 (Minimum time: 30s) 
Two students are studying for their second chemistry test.  The first chemistry test 
covered their memory for the first 20 elements; their current test will cover their memory for 
elements 21-40.  The first student has elements 21-40 written down on a sheet of paper and 
studies by just rereading that sheet of paper.  The second student has made notecards, with one 
side asking a question (for example, “What is the 23rd element?”) and the other side providing 
the answer (Vanadium).  The second student tests himself using these notecards, not even 
looking at the right answer if he is confident that he has answered the question correctly.  Which 
of the following is correct? 
a.      Only the first student is likely forget some of the first 20 elements 
 
b.      Only the second student is likely forget some of the first 20 elements 
 
c.      Whenever a cue (such as “Chemistry Element” and “23”) leads to retrieval of 
information (Vanadium), that causes the association between the cue and that information 
to strengthen.  Hence, both students are likely to forget much of the first 20 elements as a 
consequent of studying elements 21-40. 
 
Question 5 (Minimum time: 30s) 
A student of East-Asian religions has decided to learn Sanskrit so that he can read many 
of their sacred scriptures in their original language.  He studied 10 Sanskrit words on one day 
and another 10 Sanskrit words the next day.  On the third day, he tries to recall all 20 Sanskrit 
words.  Which of the following is correct? 
a. The second set of 10 words will not be as easily remembered as they otherwise would be had 
the first set of 10 words not also been learned, for the first set is using up some of the mental 
electricity 
 
b. The second set of 10 words will be more easily remembered than they otherwise would be due 
to the fact that another set of 10 words was learned first 
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c. The ability to remember the second set of 10 words will in no way be affected by the earlier 
learning of the first set of words 
 
 
Experiments 2-4: Final Test 
Question 1 (Minimum time: 45s) 
In a game of trivia, a teenager has to remember the main protagonist starring in “The 
Gladiator.”  He correctly recalls that it was Russell Crowe that played the protagonist (and NOT 
Joaquin Phoenix, who is the other star actor in that movie). 
The game swiftly moves on the next player's turn, and no mention is made of Phoenix. 
After the game, the teenager walks back to his home.  There, his parents ask him who starred in 
the movie "Walk the Line."  The correct answer is Joaquin Phoenix, and the teenager does have 
an association between Phoenix and "Walk the Line" in his memory system.  (Note also that 
Russell Crowe was NOT in this movie). 
Will the fact that the teenager remembered Crowe's name during the game of trivia make 
it a little more difficult to correctly answer this new question? 
a.      No, according to the inhibition theory, but yes, according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
b.      Yes, according to the inhibition theory, but no, according to the traditional 
interference theory of forgetting 
  
c.      Yes, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
 
Question 2 (Minimum time: 40s) 
Timmy, an 8-year old boy has just seen the movie 101 Dalmatians for the first time, and 
loved it.  He is now trying to memorize the names of all 101 Dalmatians, and has so far practiced 
encoding the first 20.  Timmy’s father, a memory researcher, is wondering what would happen if 
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he made a computer program to help Timmy study.  The program shows Timmy the names of 10 
of the Dalmatians, showing one at a time for 2 seconds.  This computer program cycles through 
the set of 10 Dalmatians 6 times.  Timmy then tries to remember the 10 Dalmatians that he 
did not just study on the computer, obviously using Dalmatians as a cue.  Will Timmy's ability to 
recall those Dalmatians be hindered by his engagement with the computer program?  
Assume that there is no inhibition failure. 
a.      One’s memory for prominent characters from the middle of the book will in not be affected 
from reading about characters from the remainder of the book 
  
b.      Characters from the middle of the book, both minor and prominent, will become less 
accessible, because they will receive less of the mental electricity when trying to remember 
characters from the book  
  
c.      One’s memory for the minor characters from the middle of the book will not be affected by 
interference from characters learned later 
 
 
Question 3 (Minimum time: 45s) 
(i) Participants had to memorize a list of 10 insects.  
(ii) Some participants studied the names of insects that are frequently encountered by us, and that 
are (for us) strongly associated to our idea of insects (e.g., beetle, ant, mosquito). 
(iii) Other participants studied the names of insects that are much less common (e.g., cicada, tick, 
locust).  
(iv) Next, every participant took a test in which they had to recall 5 of the 10 insects that were on 
his/her list.  On each test question, the participants were given the first letter of a specific insect 
that they were being tested over (e.g., "INSECT-c___?" would be a test question over 
cicada).  There were 5 of these questions; participants had to recall 5 specific insects from the list 
and NOT just any 5 from the list. 
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(v) Not surprisingly, participants who studied a list of common insects did much better on the 
test--they were each able to remember all 5 insects being tested.  The other participants could 
only remember 2 of the insects that they were tested over; on three of the test questions, these 
participants did not remember a thing. 
(vi) What was surprising, however, was that the participants who studied the common insects 
had their memory for the untested insects more negatively affected by taking the test than was 
the case for the participants who studied a list of less common insects.  Is this second result to be 
expected?  Assume that no inhibition failure occurs. 
a.      No according to the inhibition theory, but yes according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
b.       Yes according to the inhibition theory, but no according to the traditional interference 
theory of forgetting 
  
c.      Yes, according to both the inhibition theory of forgetting and the traditional 
interference theory of forgetting 
Trick Question (Minimum time: 25s) 
In a remote association task (RAT), participants are presented with 3 cues (e.g., 
“manners”-“tennis”-“round”) and are asked to come up with a word that is associated to all 3 of 
the cues (e.g., “table”).  This task is made more difficult when, prior to seeing the 3 cues, 
participants are exposed to distraction-words that are each associated with some but not all of the 
cues (e.g., “polite,” “racket,” “circle”).  This fourth question is a trick question, and I want you to 
give all twelve points to the third option.  According to the inhibitory account, should people 
who exhibit substantial retrieval-induced forgetting be more negatively affected by the 
distraction words (than people who exhibit less substantial retrieval-induced forgetting), less 
negatively affected, or equally affected? 
a)      More negatively affected 
b)     Less negatively affected 
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c)      Equally negatively affected 
 
 
Question 5 (Minimum time: 50s) 
Participants were asked to learn a number of “facts” about certain fictional 
characters.  For example, they could study the following facts about the “salesman”: the 
salesman sells apples; the salesman sells cigarettes; the salesman sells staplers; etc.  They could 
also learn facts about the librarian: the librarian likes dressers; the librarian likes trees; the 
librarian likes skateboards; etc. 
In Experiment 1, participants learned 6 facts about each of 8 characters.  In Experiment 2, 
participants learned 12 facts about each of 4 characters.  Hence, in both experiments, participants 
had to learn 48 facts.   
In both experiments, participants took a test over half the facts of each character, and the 
test determined which facts each participant would have to try to remember.  For example, "the 
librarian likes dr___?" would test a participant to see if they remember that "the librarian likes 
dressers."  Thus, participants from (say) Experiment 1 had to recall and report 3 specific facts 
about the librarian, and NOT just any 3 facts about the librarian. 
Participants had their memory for the untested facts more negatively affected from taking the test 
if they were in Experiment 2 than if they were in Experiment 1.  Is this predicted by the 
inhibition theory?  Assume that no inhibition failure occurs. 
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a. No; there should be more inhibition in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2  
  
b. Yes; there should be more inhibition in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1  
  
c. No; the untested facts should be inhibited to the same degree in both experiments  
 
Question 6 (Minimum time: 50s) 
(i) Participants study a list consisting of COTTON things (e.g., "COTTON-curtains") and of 
LEATHER things (e.g., "LEATHER-suitcase"; see full list below). 
(ii) Importantly, half of the COTTON items happen to also be instances of CLOTHING, as do 
half of the LEATHER items (see figure below). 
(iii) Participants take a practice test (PT) over some of the items ("COTTON-p___?" for 
pajamas).  Incidentally, the only items tested on the practice test are COTTON items that happen 
to be instances of CLOTHING (see figure below). 
 
(iv) After the practice test, the participants took a final test over the other examples.  In order to 
increase the difficulty of the test, cues different from the original categories were used (e.g., 
“HANGS-c___?” for curtains and “LOOP-b___?” for belt).  
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(v) How is performance on this test going to be affected from having worked through the 
practice test, according to the two prominent theories of forgetting?  Assume that memories have 
a distributed representation rather than a unitary representation only when considering the 
inhibition theory of forgetting. 
a.) Inhibition Theory:     curtain has been unaffected 
     Interference Theory: belt  has become less recallable 
  
b.) Inhibition Theory:     curtain has become less recallable 
     Interference Theory: curtain has become less recallable 
 
c.) Inhibition Theory:     curtain has become more recallable 
     Interference Theory: curtain has been unaffected 
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Appendix E 
Participants 
Twenty-nine undergraduates (21 women) from the University of Oklahoma participated.  
They ranged from 18 to 21 years of age (M = 18.6).  The Ps were predominantly White (79%), 
with the remaining Ps being American Indian or Native American (3.8%), Asian (11.5%), Black 
or African American (7.7%), and not reporting (3.8%).  Ps received class credit for participating. 
Design 
 A 2-group (Reading condition; Non-Reading condition) between-subjects design was 
used. 
Procedure 
 Ps were randomly assigned to be either in the Reading condition or in the Non-Reading 
condition.  Those in the Reading condition began by reading the two texts used in Experiments 
2-4 (see Appendix C).  They then took a test, which was the same as the final test used in 
Experiments 2-4 (see Appendix D).  Ps in the Non-Reading condition, by contrast, began by 
taking the test, without getting to read the relevant texts first. 
Results 
 Ps in the Reading group did not score significantly higher (M = 22.3, SD = 10.1) than did 
Ps in the Non-Reading group (M = 21.4, SD = 7.9), t(28) = .25, p = .40.  This pattern was not 
changed when the data were reanalyzed after one P, who had a final test score of 0, was removed 
the data set.  Again, Ps in the Reading group did not score significantly higher (M = 23.8, SD = 
8.6) than did Ps in the Non-Reading group (M = 21.4, SD = 7.9), t(27) = .74, p = .23. 
